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The Security of Self-Differencing Avalanche Photodiodes for Quantum Key
Distribution Alexander Mark Koehler-Sidki
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to communicate with informa-
tion theoretic security by encoding information on single photons. This security is
based on the laws of physics and as such can never be broken in theory. However, in
practice, components do not always behave according to their theoretical models and
these deviations can be exploited by an eavesdropper.
In recent years, exposing loopholes in QKD systems, known as quantum hacking,
has attracted significant attention. The components most susceptible to being hacked
are the single-photon detectors, often avalanche photodiodes (APDs), as they are
directly exposed to the optical channel. Whilst measurement-device-independent QKD
removes detector vulnerability from the system, secure key rates with this technique
can be much lower than point-to-point links. As such, mitigating attacks on QKD
systems is a pressing challenge in QKD.
In this thesis, the focus is on a special class of detectors, self-differencing APDs
(SD-APDs), which have facilitated state-of-the art demonstrations of QKD. The
susceptibility of SD-APDs to blinding attacks, the most explored and successful attack
to date, was investigated and it was shown that by following best practice for their
operation, such an attack would be unsuccessful. We have also proposed and developed
a countermeasure such that the onus for appropriate operation could be removed from
the user.
We have also explored an arguably more dangerous attack, in the form of the
after-gate attack. We have shown that delayed detection events, ordinarily considered
detrimental in QKD, can provide inherent protection against this attack. Finally,
backflashes in GHz-gated APDs were investigated for the first time and it was shown
that threat they pose to QKD security is negligible. These results highlight the inherent
protection to a number of attacks that self-differencing APDs possess. We stress that
the findings presented in this thesis are also applicable to other types of fast-gated
InGaAs APDs that don’t possess self-differencing circuitry.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 What is cryptography?
Secrecy underpins much of the modern world. Safeguarding sensitive information,
whether bank details or medical history or missile launch codes, is of significant
importance and as such has stimulated extensive work on the subject. The act of
communicating this information between parties relies on a method of encrypting it
such that it cannot be deciphered by any others. Broadly speaking, this is cryptography.
Cryptography as a means of communicating securely has been employed in varying
degrees for thousands of years. The Spartans in ancient Greece initially practised it
using a ‘scytale’ and Julius Caesar is said to have used a simple substitution algorithm
(that now bears his name) to encode messages to his generals [2].
The underlying aim of cryptography is to determine a way of sending information
which any hostile eavesdropper cannot access. In practice, forms of communication
can be divided into 2 types of security:
• Computational: A protocol that is computationally secure is safe from an
adversary about whom you have made reasonable assumptions related to their
computational power. However, as the adversary improves their computer, so
must you improve your protocol.
• Information theoretic: If a method is information theoretic secure, this means
that your message cannot be decoded by an eavesdropper who does not possess
knowledge of the encryption key, regardless how powerful she may be.
Information theoretic modes of cryptography do exist. Vernam’s cipher [3], also
known as the one-time pad, was developed and subsequently mathematically proven
to be information theoretic secure by Claude Shannon [4]. However, it requires a
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string for encryption and decryption, the key. This must be of equal length as the
message to be sent securely between the two parties, and this key may only be used
once. Furthermore, either the two parties must hold the key beforehand or must use a
secure channel to distribute such a key. This means that there is no practical benefit
to the protocol but it raises the theme of key distribution on which much of modern
cryptography is based.
1.2 Quantum Key Distribution
Public key encryption algorithms, such as RSA [5], exist to provide a means for
transmitting a key securely between two parties, without the need for them to hold any
prior shared secret information. The security of this is generally based on the difficulty
of factorising very large numbers, which contemporary computers struggle with.
However, quantum computers are exponentially faster at solving certain problems,
one of which is factorising [6]. In recent years, progress in quantum computers
has accelerated dramatically [7, 8] and it is estimated they could soon overtake the
most powerful ‘classical’ computers in the near future. Such an achievement would
significantly compromise much of communication security in the modern age.
One possible, and relatively advanced, solution exists in the form of quantum key
distribution (QKD). Unlike RSA, QKD schemes possess information theoretic security
due to their reliance on the laws of nature or, more specifically, quantum mechanics.
The simplest way to illustrate this is to consider a specific protocol of QKD, indeed
the first, called BB84, named after its creators, Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard,
and the year in which it was presented, 1984 [9].
A sender, Alice, would like to transmit a secure key to a receiver, Bob. To do
this securely she manipulates a specific characteristic of single photons due to their
quantum mechanical nature, namely that a making a measurement causes a perturbation
in the system [10]. In line with the original demonstration, let us assume she controls
their polarisation. The steps she carries out are as follows:
1. State preparation She first chooses a basis with which to polarise her photon,
usually either rectilinear or diagonal. She then chooses a bit, 1 or 0, correspond-
ing to vertical and diagonal, and horizontal and anti-diagonal states respectively.
The chosen states are nonorthogonal to one another to ensure any measurement
performed by an eavesdropper, Eve, would perturb the system and thus reveal
itself.
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2. Transmission Alice sends her qubits to Bob along the quantum channel, either
free-space or optical fibre.
3. Measurement Once the photons arrive at Bob, he chooses a polarisation basis
with which to measure each particle. If he chooses the same basis as Alice,
known as a compatible basis, he extracts the correct bit. Choosing an incompati-
ble basis leaves him with a 50% probability of extracting the correct bit. He is
then left with a raw key.
4. Sifting Bob then publicly announces over a classical channel which basis he
used to measure each bit and Alice publicly informs him if he chose a compatible
basis. Bits measured with incompatible bases are then discarded, leaving Bob
with the sifted key.
5. Parameter estimation Alice and Bob then publicly compare a small subset
of remaining bits to determine the quantum bit error rate (QBER). This value
represents the proportion of bits that are different between Alice and Bob, even
when a compatible measurement basis was used and is conservatively assumed
to arise exclusively due to an eavesdropper interfering, although contributions
from imperfect state preparation and detector dark counts, for example, also
play a part.
6. Error correction Alice and Bob then perform error correction to account for
the different bits between them, thus ensuring their strings are identical.
7. Privacy amplification Finally, Alice and Bob perform mathematical algorithms
known as privacy amplification to guarantee the security of the remaining bits.
Alice and Bob are then left with a shared string of bits of which Eve has no
information, known as the secure key. This is outlined in Fig. 1.1.
The security of this scheme relies on two properties of quantum mechanics. Eve
wishes to gain knowledge of the key by reading the information encoded on the photons
and remain undetected. If she tries to perform an intercept-and-resend attack, whereby
she measures the polarisation directly, she cannot know if she has chosen a compatible
basis with Alice. Therefore, if she tries to send her own photon onto Bob with the same
state in order to preserve her secrecy, half the time she will send the incorrect state.
Since Bob measures the correct state with an incompatible basis half the time as well,
the legitimate users will extract a QBER of 25% and detect Eve’s presence. It is also
not possible for Eve to make a copy of the transmitted photon for later measurement










1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 0 0 0
Secure Key 
Sifted Key 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 0
1 1 1 1 10
Fig. 1.1 BB84 An example of the BB84 protocol
1.3 QKD protocols
The above description of BB84 is an example of discrete variable QKD (DV QKD) and
is the most mature technique for performing QKD (an outline of the first demonstration
performed in 1989 can be found at [12]) and also the current state-of-the-art [13, 14].
DV-QKD utilises single photons for encoding and therefore single photon detectors are
employed at Bob’s end, however there are several specific protocols used in this way.
For example, Section 1.2 outlined a polarisation encoding scheme for BB84. Whilst
this works well over free-space, where polarisation states can travel with relatively
small perturbation, this technique is less suited to use over fibre. Therefore, phase-
encoded schemes are often used, which involve Alice encoding her qubits in the phase
difference between pulses pairs which are then decoded at Bob using a Mach-Zehnder
interferometer.
For simplicity, we will focus on BB84 for the remainder of the introduction. Other
protocols, such as differential phase shift and coherent one way, are introduced later in
section 2.5.
1.4 QKD security
Each QKD protocol uses a particular quantum mechanical property with which to
encode information, whether that be polarisation [15, 16], time-bin [17, 18], phase [19],
distributed phase [20] or even the differential quadratures of phase [21–23]. Often,
different protocols are suited to different scenarios, determined by the simplicity of
the protocol or suitability for integration into a network configuration. Another major
1.4 QKD security 5
consideration is the level of security they provide, or rather the class of attacks against
which they are secure against [24]:
• Individual attacks. As the name suggests, this addresses schemes whereby
Eve interacts individually with each qubit and she also uses the same strategy
throughout.
• Collective attacks. As above but she is able to store her ancillas in a quantum
memory for later measurement (say after Bob publicly announces his basis
choice).
• Coherent or general attacks. Eve can perform any attack allowed by the laws
of quantum mechanics.
Although QKD can be shown to be information theoretic secure in theory, in
practice this may not be true, largely due to deviations of components from their ideal
behaviour. These imperfections can provide side-channels for Eve to exploit, meaning
that QKD systems require continuous characterisation and testing, eventually resulting
in hardware or software modifications or incorporating these deviations into security
proofs.
As example, in an ideal case, Alice would utilise a perfect single photon source
with which to encode her key. Currently, single-photon sources have been unable to
reach the brightness suitable for practical QKD [25], therefore heavily attenuated laser
pulses (with average photon numbers less than 1), known as weak coherent pulses
(WCP), are used to simulate single photons. However, due to the coherent nature of
WCPs, the output is a Poissonian distribution [26] meaning there is a finite possibility
of an output pulse containing more than one photon 1.
Eve could then employ a photon-number-splitting attack (PNS) [28, 29] whereby
she siphons off any additional photons and stores them in her quantum memory before
performing her measurement after Alice and Bob publicly exchange basis information.
This loophole was then closed with the advent of the decoy state method [30, 31],
whereby Alice sends a range of fluxes to Bob, which usually consist of a signal,
decoy and vacuum pulse [19]. By analysing the photon statistics at Bob for each
state, the users can determine whether Eve is attempting to mount a PNS attack. This
problem has also been tackled separately with the implementation of the SARG04
QKD protocol [32], but this has largely been abandoned in favour of the decoy state
method as it scales less favourably with distance [24].
1Even if the non-attenuated source is not necessarily Poissonian and demonstrates, say, Bose-Einstein
distribution, the statistics after the attenuator can be well approximated as Poissonian [27].
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A further prominent example is the Trojan Horse attack, whereby Eve again aims to
target imperfections at Alice’s side. Eve injects strong light into the transmitter’s setup
which undergoes the same phase modulation used for encoding single photons for key
distribution. By measuring the reflection, Eve can learn which states Alice chooses
and thus obtain the key [10, 33], shown in Fig. 1.2. By considering a practical setup,
a quantitative security analysis was performed resulting in a passive countermeasure






Fig. 1.2 Trojan horse attack Eve injects strong light into Alice’s system and measures
the reflection from her encoding device and can thereby extract the bit encoded by
Alice.
1.4.1 Measurement device independent QKD
Due to the vulnerability of detectors within a QKD system (see Chapter 2 for examples),
protocols have been explored that are detector side-channel free [35, 36]. Due to its
ability to be implemented with current technology, significant work has focused on
measurement-device-independent QKD, or MDI-QKD. This protocol utilises a third,
untrusted party, conventionally known as Charlie, who carries out any detection and
publicly broadcasts his results. Briefly, Alice and Bob each have a source of photons
on which they encode one of the BB84 polarization states. They then each send
their photon to Charlie who carries out a Bell State Measurement, BSM, on both
particles by means of 3 sets of beamsplitters and recording any coincidence counts
(see figure 1.3). This type of measurement relies on the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM)
effect [37] which states that indistinguishable particles incident on the same input port
of a balanced beamsplitter will leave from the same output port. After announcing
his results, Alice and Bob publicly disclose their chosen bases (but not states) and are
left with a perfectly anti-correlated string of bits. Bob then flips the necessary bits
and him and Alice now share a secure key [38]. In contrast to other QKD protocols
whereby Alice has a key she wishes to send to Bob, here neither Alice nor Bob start
out with a complete key; it is only through each of them encoding information on their
photons and by listening to Charlie’s measurement results that they obtain a key. As
such, were Charlie to be replaced with Eve, she would gain no information as to the
key by controlling the detectors.






















Fig. 1.3 Basic principle of MDI-QKD All detection is carried out at an untrusted
node, Charlie, hence detector side-channels are removed.
One recent study on MDI-QKD was carried out in [39] using optically seeded
lasers, whereby a master laser was used to inject a slave laser. This allowed for high
visibilities and consequently coincidence counts, allowing for much higher secure
key rates than the highest previously achieved [40]. However it is important to note
that this work was only a proof-of-principle experiment as it did not employ real-time
polarisation basis or state modulation. Although MDI-QKD removes the existence
of detector side-channels, it is likely unsuitable for widespread adoption due to the
difficulty of performing two-photon interference, even with the laser-seeing technique
demonstrated in [39]. Furthermore, over medium distances, the secure key rates are
significantly lower than point-to-point links (ref).
Since MDI-QKD relies on the existence of coincidence counts, which only arise
due to very precise photon arrival times, the key rates can still be low when compared
to two-party QKD schemes. As such, detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD)
was developed [41]. In this method, a photon is sent by Alice and encoded in one
polarisation degree of freedom, DoF, and then sent to Bob, who then encodes another
DoF on the same photon before performing a BSM, on this particle. After announcing
the result of the BSM, Alice and Bob can obtain a secure key. In this way, Alice and
Bob are not reliant on coincidence counts at Charlie’s detectors for obtaining their
key and can therefore obtain much higher key rates than with MDI-QKD. Once more,
however, the most recent experimental implementation was also proof-of-principle
[42]. Furthermore, unlike MDI, in order for the security to be guaranteed, Eve cannot
have direct access to the detectors used for the BSM [42–44].
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A recently proposed protocol, known as Twin-Field QKD (TF QKD) [45] appears
to provide the detector side-channel free characteristics of MDI-QKD in addition to
extending the achievable distance such that it overcomes the fundamentally unsurpass-
able bound [46]. The increased performance arises from it using the interference of
optical fields, rather than individual photons. This has stimulated a significant body of
work, with several proof-of-principle implementations taking place [47–50], as well as
additional variants such as sending-not-sending [51, 52] and security analyses [53].
1.5 Practical QKD
When considering real-world implementation, QKD performance and security is
subject to a number of caveats. These arise due to practical constraints on what is
available to Alice and Bob. For example, in theory, Alice and Bob will use an infinitely
long key for the purpose of encoding their secure message. Of course this is impossible
as the users have limited computational power, hence they have to take into account the
finite length of the key when carrying out error correction and privacy amplification so
as to have an accurate estimate of Eve’s knowledge of the key [54]. This procedure
naturally impacts the secure key rate, giving a more pessimistic estimate. The analysis
of the two cases are generally referred to as the asymptotic and finite-key size analyses.
The secure key rate is dependent on a number of system parameters, some of which
are due to physical properties of components, others to protocol choice or security
analysis technique.
QKD is generally performed either over free-space or fibre (although recent un-
derwater implementations have also taken place [55–57]). Whilst free-space demon-
strations have shown promise in recent years, most notably in the performance of the
Micius quantum satellite [58–60], fibre-based systems are the most promising future
candidates for widespread implementation. This is largely due to the stability offered
by installed fibre and also the existence of mature fibre infrastructure. As such, the
channel loss is well defined, typically at 0.2 dB/km for currently installed fibre [61] or
0.16 dB/km for ultralow-loss fibre [14]. In addition to this, crosstalk from classical
traffic can also play a part, but for simplicity we assume dark fibre is used.
The performance of the detectors at Bob, or indeed Charlie, have arguably the
most direct impact on the secure key rate. The detection efficiency naturally allows
a higher proportion of sent qubits to be correctly measured. However, a trade-off
often arises between the efficiency and detector dark count rate, a characteristic which
limits the achievable distance of QKD. This occurs because the losses become much
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larger at longer distances, thus degrading Alice’s transmitted photons and reducing the
signal-to-noise ratio.
The proportion of detected bits to sifted bits is determined by the choice of protocol.
For standard BB84, since each basis has an equal probability of being chosen, the
sifting efficiency is 50%. This can be improved using alternative protocols; for example
in the T12 protocol it is very close to unity [19].
The sifting efficiency can be improved further by expanding the choice of protocols
outside of those similar to BB84. The distributed phase shift protocol only employs
one basis, therefore Alice and Bob always have compatibly bases and the sifting
efficiency is unity. The drawback of this protocol is its security has not yet been proven
against coherent attacks.
The overall operating frequency of the system also directly affects the key rate.
This feature is limited by the bandwidths of the sources at Alice and the detectors at
Bob/Charlie, with the state-of-the-art systems employing 1 or 2 GHz-clocked systems
[13].
We can analyse the impact of these parameters on the secure key rate. Usually,
weak coherent pulses combined with decoy states are considered but for simplicity
we will examine the relationship between the key rate and distance by assuming a
perfect single-photon source where there is no need for decoy states and the raw key is
infinitely long. We start with the probability of a detection or click at Bob’s detectors,
given by equation 1.1:
Pclick = ηchan ×ηdet (1.1)
where ηchan is the channel loss and is given by 10−
αL
10 , where α is the loss coefficient
in fibre (0.2 dB/km) and L is the distance in km. ηdet is simply the detection efficiency
of Bob’s detectors, which we assume to be 30%. We then define the quantum bit
error rate (QBER), which is in its simplest form the probability that, given a click,
there will be an error. These errors are conservatively assigned to the presence of an
eavesdropper, however, in practice, imperfections in the QKD system have a significant
impact. For example, if Alice and Bob have poor interferometers with low visibility,
this increases the probability of incorrect bits being measured, even if compatible
bases between the legitimate users are chosen. Furthermore, if Bob uses detectors with
a high dark count rate, the probability of multiple detectors clicking in a system is
higher. In this case, Bob randomly chooses a bit, which thereby increases the number
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The denominator in the first term indicates the total number of clicks. The numera-
tor is then the probability of an incorrect bit being measured even when a compatible
basis is chosen. This arises when the correct detector does not click, 1−Pclick but the
incorrect one does, due to a dark count, Pdark. The afterpulsing probability, Pap is then
treated separately as these clicks are uncorrelated with Alice’s qubits, therefore have a
probability of 12 of generating an error. Popt is the error due to optical misalignment,
possibly as a result of poor interferometers discussed earlier. For the purpose of
determining the key rate, we take values of Pdark to be 10−6, Pap to be 3% and Popt to
be 1%. The secure key rate is then given in equation 1.3:
R ≥ qPclick {1−h(e)− f h(e)} (1.3)
where q is the basis choice probability, which is 0.5 for BB84, h(x) is the binary
Shannon entropy and is given by h(x) =−x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) and f is the
error correction efficiency, which is simply taken to be 1.15. Using the aforementioned
parameters, we plot the secure key rate as a function of distance as the black line in
Fig. 1.4. We see that using low loss-fibre (0.16 dB/km), detectors with a higher dark
count rate (10−4), efficient BB84 protocol, such as T12 [19] (q = 1516 ) or incorporating
a detection mismatch or blinding parameter (multiplying 1−h(e) by a coefficient of
0.79 [62]) all have a significant impact on the secure key rate.
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Fig. 1.4 Key rate comparison Secure key rate in bits per signal as a function of
distance in km. This shows the effect that various parameters can have on the key
rate, such as using ultra-low loss fibre, a more efficient protocol or by incorporating a
blinding parameter.
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1.6 Current implementations of QKD
Since its initial conception, QKD has developed considerably, such that it is on the
cusp of becoming a part of everyday life. However, implementation techniques still
differ widely, meaning it is useful to survey the range of methods and components
used for carrying out QKD.
1.6.1 Channel
When considering the quantum channel over which QKD performed, this can essen-
tially be divided into either free-space or fibre implementations.
The first experimental demonstration of QKD was performed over 30.5 cm of free
space [12] and since then it has developed significantly, culminating in the demon-
stration of satellite to ground QKD in [60]. Whilst this was a landmark achievement
where QKD was performed over extraordinary distances, free-space QKD faces hard
challenges in the forms of atmospheric turbulence and beam wandering which can
degrade the QKD signal. On the other hand, it benefits from the ability to exploit
visible wavelengths for transmitting qubits, for which high-performing detectors are
readily available.
The latter is the more mature technique, largely because the fibre infrastructure
required is already in place but also because the loss is easy to characterise, usually at
a rate of 0.2 dB/km. This also makes the implementation of a quantum network more
straightforward than over free-space and has spurned the development of several net-
works [63–65]. In all likelihood, both techniques will combined, much as they are with
current classical transmission which employs both wired and wireless transmission, in
order to maximise coverage.
1.6.2 Sources
As discussed in section 1.4, in an ideal world, QKD would be performed with single-
photon sources. However, the current state-of-the-art is insufficiently bright for prac-
tical QKD. As such, distributed feedback (DFB) laser diodes attenuated to very low
light levels such that they emit weak coherent pulses (WCPs) are more commonly
used.
WCPs display a Poissonian distribution, where the probability of emitting an






where µ is the average number of photons. Due to the aforementioned photon
number splitting attack, average fluxes are usually less than 1 in order to minimise the
number of multi-photon components. By employing the decoy state method, QKD
using sources of this type are still secure. Although systems employing true single-
photon sources can offer potentially higher secure key rates [66, 67], the availability
and ease-of-use of laser diodes means it is unlikely they will be supplanted in the near
future.
1.6.3 Detectors
The choice of detector has a significant impact on the key rate both as a result of
its detection efficiency and dark count rate. Furthermore, it is the most vulnerable
component in the QKD system due to its exposure to the optical channel. As the
detectors are the focus of this thesis, it is useful to survey in detail the current state-of-
the-art, which is summarised in Table 1.1.
For fibre-based systems, InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs) have developed
to become the prime candidate for single-photon detectors at Bob. This is largely
due to their (close to) room-temperature operation, very good single-photon detection
characteristics, reasonably low-cost and low footprint. Within that category, different
modes of operation have evolved, with the vast majority of systems and groups using
gated detectors due to their capability for large count rates. To further increase the
count rates, several background cancellation techniques have been developed, namely
sine-wave gating, dummy mode cancellation and self-differencing, the latter of which
has resulted in record detection efficiencies of 55% [68].
The other major alternative to APDs are superconducting nanowire single-photon
detectors (SSPDs). As the name suggests, these consist of nanowires that are cooled to
superconducting levels which are then biased close to their critical current, which is the
point at which the wire becomes resistive. When a photon impinges on the nanowire,
a local hotspot is created where the temperature is raised and the resistance changes,
thus triggering a voltage pulse which can be measured. These can offer detection
efficiencies that easily exceed 80% as well as dark count rates as low as 0.1 mHz [69].
However, the need to operate them cryogenically, usually at 2K or lower, which means
they are also bulky makes them unlikely to be widely adopted, although they could be
suitable for specific high-value applications.
1.6 Current implementations of QKD 13
Detector T (K) η (%) DCR (Hz) Jitter (ps) Max CR (MHz)
Passive APD [70] 163 10 1 400 0.05
Sine wave APD [71] 243 30 2000 138 10
SD APD [68] 243 55 30000 91 500
SSPD [69] 1.6 67 0.0001 29 2000
SSPD [72] 0.8 93 1 150 25
TES [73] 0.2 98 - - -
Table 1.1 State-of-the-art single photon detectors for fibre-based QKD. T: temper-
ature; η: single photon detection efficiency; DCR: dark count rate; CR: count rate;
SD APD: self-differencing avalanche photodiode; SSPD: superconducting nanowire
single-photon detector; TES: transition edge sensor.
1.6.4 State of the art QKD
The current situation of QKD is one of great promise and significant advances have
taken place in recent years. As discussed, it is likely that fibre-based systems will carry
out the bulk of QKD and form the backbone of any quantum networks in the future.
This can be seen with the announcements of several QKD networks throughout the
globe [15, 63–65]. In the context of this, there have been several landmark studies.
In terms of maximum achievable distance over which keys have been distributed, the
previous record of 404 km [74], which was performed using MDI QKD, has recently
been overtaken; firstly, by a group using a simplified variant of BB84 and aided by
ultra-low loss fibre and high efficiency SSPDs [14], next through the use of the new
protocol of TF-QKD [75]. Secure key rates at shorter distances have also reached
record levels thanks largely to improved data processing techniques [13].
Whilst fibre-based QKD systems have developed significantly, the loss associated
with fibres combined with the lack of availability of quantum repeaters places an
absolute limit of achievable distance. As such, interest grew surrounding satellite
QKD, where the losses could be significantly reduced and this culminated in the
demonstration of QKD using the Micius satellite [58]. It is possible that in the future,
a network of satellites combined with a fibre-based network including trusted nodes
will provide global quantum-secured communication.
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1.7 Motivation for research
Public key encryption techniques, such as RSA, currently guarantee the security of
everything from bank details to personal health records. However, they will become
obsolete once quantum computers that are capable of performing Shor’s algorithm
with sufficiently small numbers of errors are built. With the recent announcement
of quantum supremacy being (possibly) achieved [76], replacing current encryption
techniques that are not susceptible to the threats of quantum computers is becoming
increasingly urgent.
The security of QKD is guaranteed by the laws of physics and can therefore offer
information theoretic security irrespective of the development of quantum computers.
It is now rapidly approaching a level of maturity where it can be considered for
commercialisation. Its potential as a cryptographic primitive has stimulated significant
developments in recent years and has resulted in pilot network field trials in several
continents [15, 65, 77–79]. For widespread implementation, InGaAs APDs are the
most attractive candidates due to their ability to operate close to room temperature
whilst displaying excellent detection characteristics and having a small footprint. Those
using self-differencing circuitry demonstrated the highest count rates, largest detection
efficiencies and greatest secure key rates, making them the current best-performing
detectors.
As such, addressing loopholes associated with detector attacks is a pressing concern
in order to maintain such a high level of security. Whilst MDI-QKD closes all
detector side-channels, it is difficult to implement and offers lower key rates at short
distances compared to point-to-point QKD. It is therefore desirable to improve the
implementation security of more mature two-party systems.
The problem can be tackled in two ways. The first way is to devise countermeasures
to these attacks, such that an eavesdropper, whose only restriction is to be bounded by
the laws of physics, cannot perform said attack. Whilst attractive in theory, in practice
this is a difficult objective to achieve, as it usually involves hardware modifications
which either introduce additional complexity or loss. Furthermore, extra components
need characterising and could contain loopholes of their own, as well as the fact that it
is difficult to prove the effectiveness of a countermeasure.
The second way, which is gaining more attention, as shown by the work of ETSI
(European Telecommunications Standards Institute) [80], is to define best-practice
criteria and eventually standards for each component, in order to minimise Eve’s
capability. This requires some assumptions about Eve’s capabilities and therefore
aims at satisfying ‘practical’ security. Since many of Eve’s attacks are not possible
with current technology as they require significant advances, in quantum memories,
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for example, it is perfectly valid to aspire to practical security. Furthermore, many
experimentally demonstrated attacks rely on improper or inappropriate operation of
components, making the need for universal standards even more pressing.
As mentioned, detectors are the most vulnerable components in the QKD system,
hence it is natural to focus on these devices for exploring QKD security. Due to their
ability to demonstrate excellent single-photon detection without the need for cryogenic
cooling, APDs are the most natural choice for QKD implementation. The state-of-the-
art detectors employ self-differencing circuitry for improved signal-to-noise which
has enabled QKD systems using such detectors to obtain record secure key rates [13].
Therefore, improving the practical security of self-differencing avalanche photodiodes
would be a significant step in guaranteeing the security of a QKD system and enabling
it to be widely implemented.
1.8 Organisation of thesis
The thesis is organised to reflect the overall aim of the PhD, which was to improve
the security of self-differencing APDs in QKD. Therefore, individual techniques that
have been demonstrated as attacks were examined and measures to mitigate them
were demonstrated. Chapter 2 gives a background to avalanche photodiodes, particu-
larly focusing on their quenching techniques. Chapter 3 illustrates how inappropriate
operation of self-differencing APDs provides a backdoor for Eve and outlines the
best-practice criteria for operating these detectors to restrict Eve’s hacking ability.
Chapter 4 describes the implementation of an intensity modulator to act as an active
measure against Eve’s blinding attack. The extinction required for successful blinding
prevention is characterised and a discussion surrounding its security is presented.
Chapter 5 explores how the after-gate attack can be mitigated by exploiting delayed de-
tection events, phenomena usually considered detrimental for QKD but here exploited
to the users’ advantage. Chapter 6 characterises backflashes in fast gated APDs and
relates their effect on Eve’s information to the secure key rate. Chapter 7 concludes the






This chapter will provide an overview of single-photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs),
including the device structure. The various techniques used to operate them, specifi-
cally with regards to quenching, will also be introduced. The literature surrounding
previous attacks on detectors in QKD systems will also be explored.
2.2 Avalanche photodiodes
Avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are, broadly speaking, reverse-biased PN- or PIN-
structured semiconductor devices that absorb incoming photons and generate electron-
hole pairs. Most significantly, APDs contain an additional multiplication region
allowing them to possess internal gain, therefore a single photon can generate enough
carriers which results in a macroscopic current detectable by conventional electronics,
removing the need for a separate amplifier which could introduce additional noise. This
particular characteristic makes APDs very practical single-photon detectors and this,
coupled with their ability to operate at temperatures reachable with thermo-electric
cooling, or even room temperature, make them ideal candidates for QKD.
As discussed previously, fibre-based QKD is the most mature and attractive tech-
nique, therefore detectors need to be sensitive to light of wavelengths that propagate
with minimal loss over fibre, usually at either 1310 or 1550 nm [10]. Many APDs
used for these wavelengths are currently manufactured with a structure based on the
separate- absorption-and-multiplication regions (SAM) design which was first pro-
posed in [81]. The SAM heterojunction structure was developed in order to reduce
the existence of dark currents that arose from tunnelling that was evident in previous
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homojunction APDs [82]. The most common combination of materials for these layers
are InGaAs and InP, for use as the absorption and multiplication regions respectively
[83]. InAlAs [84, 85] and silicon [86] multiplication regions have also been explored
due to the materials’ large k-coefficients (sometimes referred to as the excess noise
factor or ionisation rate ratio) which is the ratio of the electron, α , and hole, β ,
ionisation coefficients [87]. It has been shown that for an ideal case, this value should
either equal 0 or ∞ so that only one type of carrier contributes to the avalanche process
and therefore the multiplication noise is at its lowest [88]. For InP, holes have a
higher coefficient [89, 90] and therefore the structure of these devices is optimised to
accelerate holes, rather than electrons, to the multiplication layer. Later the SAGM or
SAGCM design was developed which included grading and charge layers respectively
[91]. The grading layer, usually InGaAsP for InGaAs/InP APDs, is used to increase the
rate of transition of holes from the absorption to the multiplication region by grading
the discontinuity in valence-band between the two layers [92, 93]. The charge, or
field control, layer allows for higher flexibility in controlling the internal electric field




























Fig. 2.1 SAM APD Band diagram of the separate absorption, charge and multiplica-
tion structure of an InGaAs/InP APD, where Eg is the band gap offset and EA is the
effective barrier height.
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2.2.1 Characteristics
As mentioned earlier, APDs are attractive candidates for QKD largely due to their
ability to demonstrate strong single-photon detection at temperatures reachable by
thermo-electric cooling [68] or even room temperature [95]. This places them ahead
of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SSPDs) which have very high
detection efficiencies (exceeding 85% [96]) but have to be cryogenically cooled,
typically to below 2 K [97]. APDs also register high count rates due to their low dead
times, again an advantage over some SSPDs [96] and transition edge sensors [98].
In this section, I will outline the characteristics of interest for single-photon APDs
in QKD. For a more general review on single photon detectors, I refer the reader to
[99, 100].
Detection efficiency
The most crucial characteristic when examining the merit of an APD in the context of
QKD is its single photon detection efficiency (SPDE). It specifies the probability that
an incident photon is detected. It is given by the following equation:
SPDE = Pabs ×Pc ×Pav ×Pdet (2.1)
where Pabs is the photon absorption probability, i.e. whether an incident photon gen-
erates an electron-hole pair, Pc is the probability that a carrier, either a hole or an
electron depending on the device, arrives at the multiplication region, Pav is the prob-
ability of an avalanche taking place [101] and Pdet is the probability of detecting an
avalanche which is dependent on the external circuitry. The first two factors multiplied
together give the external quantum efficiency, and is the absolute upper bound of the
device’s single-photon detection efficiency. Equation 2.1 gives a strong insight into
how the detection efficiency of a device might be improved. For example, improving
the grading between the absorption and charge regions to minimise the effect of the
lattice mismatch and ‘trapping’ at the subsequent potential well can increase Pc or
improvements in anti-reflection coatings can increase Pabs
Dark count rate
Dark counts arise, as the name suggests, when the detector fires without any incident
light or, more specifically, when a carrier is generated by means other than photoex-
citation. In general, these counts arise either due to thermal generation, which is
20 Background
dependent on the band gap of the absorption material as well as the temperature [102]
or various tunnelling effects, either band-to-band or trap assisted [101]. Dark counts
can also arise from carriers generated in different regions of the absorption layer or
even outside the active area [103].
Afterpulsing
Another contribution to APD noise arises from so-called ’afterpulsing’. These are
counts that occur due to the release of carriers that were trapped in previous avalanches
[1]. If such a detrapping occurs during a time interval where the APD is primed
for detection (sometimes referred to as an ’ON’ period), it can trigger an avalanche
of its own. In order to reduce this effect, it is often desirable to reduce the ’ON’
time and allow a longer dead time between detection events which creates a smaller
avalanche charge per event and thus lower afterpulsing [68]. This is due to the fact
that afterpulses are generally thought to arise from defects in the InP multiplication
region, hence fewer charges reduces the probability of trapping [1, 104, 105]. The
afterpulsing probability has been directly included in previous treatments of the QBER
[106], as shown in Eq. 1.2.
This shows the afterpulsing probability can directly impact the performance of the
QKD system, where if it is greater than 22%, the QBER would exceed 11% and above
this threshold most protocols would abort key exchange altogether.
Dead Time
The time between an APD detecting an incident photon and being sensitive to a
subsequent photon is known as the dead time or recovery time. Considering the
detector in isolation, this is the time between an avalanche being initiated and being
quenched and is therefore affected by the quenching electronics (see section 2.3).
However, often counting or discriminating electronics have much greater deadtimes
and therefore play more of a significant role [13], meaning the dead time of the entire
detector chain needs to be considered. This is an important parameter for QKD as
it determines the maximum count rates the detector can achieve and is thus directly
related to the secure key rate.
Timing jitter
The statistical variation in the time between photon absorption and an electron being
detected is known as the timing jitter, or timing resolution. This also includes any jitter
from the corresponding electronics and so more accurately refers to the jitter of the
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entire detector system, but in general the detector jitter dominates [99]. Higher electric
fields, and thus higher excess voltages, have been shown to decrease the jitter with
the added consequence of higher dark count rates and higher detection efficiencies.
[107, 108]
The detector diameter also has a significant impact as this dictates the area over
which the avalanche spreads such that the diode becomes conducting, meaning larger
area devices have a larger jitter [108]. Detectors with a large jitter increase the
possibility of intersymbol interference occurring and can result in an increased QBER
and therefore a reduced secure key rate.
Photon number resolution
It is also useful to consider whether a detector is capable of distinguishing photon
number. This can add an extra level of security against photon number splitting attacks
[109], not to mention being essential for other quantum information applications,
such as linear optics quantum computation [110]. Multi-pixel APDs for visible
wavelengths have already been shown to demonstrate impressive photon number
resolution [111, 112], however devices have yet to reach a similar level of maturity for
detectors sensitive in the near-infrared [113]. Having said that, limited photon number
resolution has been achieved with single pixel devices [114–116] and utilising such
devices for detecting photon number is appealing due to the fact that there is no loss of
detection efficiency as a result of geometric fill-factor [111].
The above characteristics can be grouped together to give an overall figure of merit
which can be useful for assessing an APD, several of which are covered in [117] and
[99]. It is however often not possible to make direct comparisons between detectors
due to factors such as geometry, existence of pixels and values quoted at different
parameters (e.g. detection efficiency measured at different temperatures or at different
dark count rates). As such, there cannot be one, universal way of quantifying the merit
of detectors and they should be chosen based on their desired application.
2.3 Operational regimes for APDs
Although APDs are widely used in classical optical communications [118], the con-
ditions under which they are operated for such an application are vastly different to
those used for QKD. The difference between the two is best explained by considering
an I-V curve of an APD, as shown in Fig. 2.2.
For classical communication, the device is operated in linear mode. This regime
occurs above the APD punch through voltage, where the gain is unity and impact
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Fig. 2.2 I-V curve of a device characterised under dark and illuminated conditions
from [1]. The first shoulder under illumination indicates the punch through voltage,
where the gain of the device is unity. Above this voltage, the APD is said to operate in
linear mode. The breakdown voltage is given either by the second shoulder under dark
conditions, or when the dark current reaches 1µA. APDs for single-photon detection
are usually biased above this value.
ionisation begins to occur, and is shown by the initial shoulder under illumination in
Fig. 2.2. When used in telecommunication applications, the gain is usually between 1
and 100 [118]. In the linear regime, the number of generated carriers is proportional
to the number of absorbed photons, hence the relationship, and the mode, is linear [1].
When biasing the device further, the APD reaches its breakdown voltage, which is
variously described as either the shoulder under dark conditions where the dark current
suddenly increases [119] or when the dark current reaches 1-10 µA [1]. Above this
particular voltage, a generated avalanche under impact ionisation now becomes self-
sustaining. This results in an individual photon generating many more carriers, enough
to produce a macroscopic current detectable by conventional electronics. This regime
is known as Geiger mode, so named due to its similarity in behaviour to Geiger-Müller
tubes [101].
Due to the self-sustaining nature of the avalanche, it is necessary to quench the
avalanche to protect the device from damage but also to prime it for future detection
[120]. A number of techniques have been developed and are outlined below.
2.3.1 Passive quenching
The earliest and simplest technique for quenching an avalanche is to do so passively,
with a resistor placed in series in the APD biasing circuit. When a photon is detected
2.3 Operational regimes for APDs 23
and the current in the device rises, the resistor automatically quenches the avalanche
and primes the device for the next detection event. Due to its simplicity and the
lack of necessity for any active circuitry, this procedure is employed for detectors
operated in free-running mode where the bias voltage remains constant over time and
the detector is sensitive to photons at any time interval. Despite its ease-of-use, the
reset or quenching time of detectors operated this way can be problematic as it is
related to the capacitance and bias resistance (or time constant) in the circuit [120].
This means that large key rates are not usually achievable due to low count rates on





Fig. 2.3 Passive quenching. The earliest and simplest technique for quenching an
avalanche. A large bias or load resistor is used to reduce the voltage below the
breakdown voltage, and thus quench the device. VDC: DC voltage; RL: Load resistor;
RS: Sensing resistor.
2.3.2 Active quenching
In order to combat the slow recovery times exhibited by passively-quenched APDs,
active quenching was developed [122]. This technique involves sensing the rise of the
avalanche and ‘reacting back on’ the APD and quenching it [107]. The existence of
this feedback loop, where a comparator senses the rise of the avalanche and switches
the output voltage to a value above or below the breakdown voltage depending on the
current sensed, is the significant step that separates active from passive quenching.
The switching is usually implemented by means of a fast transistor, however circuits
can easily have a significantly larger amount of complexity. Count rates can be larger
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than passively-quenched APDs [123] but still fall short of the GHz level that can be













Fig. 2.4 Active quenching. Circuit reproduced from [81]. VA: Applied voltage; D:
Fast switch; CC; Capacitor; R: Resistor; Comp: Comparator.
2.3.3 Gating
For QKD, APDs are usually operated in gated mode, as the arrival times of photons
from Alice only occurs in discrete time windows. This involves periodically biasing
the device above and below the breakdown, thus producing ‘ON’ times, where the
APD is primed for detection, and ‘OFF’ times, where it is insensitive to single photons
and the avalanche is quenched. It is common for this to be done with either square
waves or pulses.
An example of an early implementation of this technique is the coincidence method
[125, 126]. This way of performing gating involves essentially correlating detection
events with the ‘ON’ time of the gating signal by means of a logic AND gate. However,
to minimise the effect of registering electronic noise, the discrimination level is usually
set quite high, meaning weak avalanches avoid detection. This becomes problematic
when devices are biased at higher gating frequencies that would be desirable to achieve
higher count rates for QKD as the capacitive response would be of a comparable
magnitude to the avalanches, making discrimination difficult. In such cases, where
‘ON’ times are short, avalanches have less time to build up and so would be too weak to
be detected. As discussed in section 2.2.1, a further incentive for having shorter gates is
the existence of additional spurious counts that are correlated with legitimate detection
events, known as afterpulsing. The exact nature and origin of these afterpulses is still
an open question, but generally they are attributed to deep traps in the multiplication
layer [104, 119, 127]. For this reason, limiting the avalanche charge by having shorter
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gates is desirable but additional background cancellation techniques needed to be




Fig. 2.5 Gating scheme for a single-photon APD, where the detector is periodically
biased above and below its breakdown voltage, the amount of which is known as the
excess voltage. The AC signal is combined with a constant DC signal to drive the
device. VDC: DC voltage applied to the device; VAC: AC signal; RS: Sensing resistor;
VBr: Breakdown voltage; VEX : Excess voltage.
Sine-wave gating
One technique for achieving good APD performance at high gating frequencies is
to use a sine wave instead of a square wave or pulse for gating the detector. This
means that the capacitive response can simply be neglected using a cascade of band
rejection filters centred at the gating frequency, thereby making it straightforward to
discriminate avalanches from the background.
APDs operated in this way have shown promising results with gating frequencies
exceeding 1 GHz [128, 129, 71], detection efficiencies as high as 30 % [71] and
afterpulse probability less than 1% [130]. Although these achievements, in addition
to significant developments such as miniaturisation of the APD module [71], are




Developed in [131], self-differencing (SD) is a type of background cancellation tech-
nique usually employed with square-wave gated detectors. The output of a gated
detector is first split in half. One of the two halves is then delayed by a gating period
(i.e. 1 ns for a 1 GHz gated detector). The two arms are then recombined, which
results in the cancellation of the majority of the capacitive response, leaving a positive
and negative signal which can easily be discriminated from the residual background,









Fig. 2.6 Self-differencing Outline of a self-differencing circuit. The output of a gated
detector is split in half and one arm is delayed by a gating period (e.g. 1 ns for a 1 GHz
gated APD) and the two arms are then recombined. This leaves a positive followed by
a negative signal that are clearly distinguishable from any remaining noise.
Thus far, InGaAs APDs operated this way have achieved the highest detection
efficiency of 55% [68], record count rates of 1 GHz [132] and facilitated record secure
key rates of up to 13.7 Mbits/s in QKD [13]. As such, they can be considered the
state-of-the-art and are the focus for the work outlined in this thesis.
Significantly, due to the cancellation technique, APDs with SD circuits cannot
detect consecutive avalanches, hence the theoretical maximum count rates of an SD
APD is half its gating frequency. As outlined earlier, due to the unavailability of
suitable single photon sources, under ordinary QKD operation Alice employs weak
coherent pulses. These have an average flux of less than 1 to reduce Eve’s ability
to take advantage of the Poissonian nature of the pulses and perform the photon-
number-splitting attack. As such, even when neglecting decoy pulses, the probability
of consecutive pulses becomes very small, particularly at longer distances.
However, this particular characteristic of SD APDs can be exploited by Eve to
perform a detector control attack. She can force Bob’s APD to register avalanches in
each gate, thus causing complete cancellation. She can then send her own strong pulses
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and thus have control over when Bob’s detectors click. This is a class of blinding
attack, which it is helpful to briefly review before exploring this attack further.
2.4 Vulnerabilities of InGaAs APDs in QKD
2.4.1 Detector attacks
The single-photon detectors at Bob are the most vulnerable component within a QKD
system due to their exposure through the quantum channel. This allows Eve the
opportunity to manipulate the signal Bob measures in an effort to extract the secure
key. Whilst a conventional intercept-and-resend attack won’t work, a modified variant
of this, known as the faked-state attack [133] has been demonstrated to be effective ,
insomuch as Eve can extract some or all of the key without alerting the users to her
presence [134]. This involves forcing Bob’s detectors to click only when he chooses a
compatible basis with Eve. This relies on his detectors acting as threshold detectors,
whereby they always click with an optical power above a certain value, and never
when below it, which we denote as Pth. This is most clearly explained by considering
passive-basis choice polarisation encoded BB84. Bob uses 4 detectors in 2 pairs,
corresponding to the rectilinear and diagonal bases respectively. It is assumed these
detectors are made to behave as threshold detectors, through blinding or any other
mechanism. Say Eve has measured the qubit sent by Alice in the vertical polarisation
using a copy of Bob’s setup. She then encodes her faked pulse with her measured
polarisation and configures it to have an optical power of twice the amount required to
make Bob’s detectors click, 2Pth. This is split in half at the first beamsplitter, directing
Pth down each arm. At the diagonal basis detectors, the power is split again at the
polarising beamsplitter as it corresponds to an incompatible basis. Each detector sees
a power of Pth2 and therefore neither of them register a click. At the rectilinear basis
detectors, all the power goes down one arm and only the corresponding detector clicks,
thereby giving Eve and Bob perfectly correlated bits. This is outlined in Fig 2.7.
Whilst attacks have been investigated targeting a number of detection mecha-
nisms, such as homodyne detectors for CV-QKD [135], superconducting nanowire
single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) [136, 137], and even photomultiplier tubes [138],
those involving avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are the most prominent due to their
widespread use and promising characteristics for later commercial implementation.
Although silicon APDs have attractive characteristics such as very high detection
efficiencies (>70%) [139], their spectral sensitivity does not extend to the telecom




















Fig. 2.7 Faked-state attack Shown on a passive basis choice BB84 setup. Each pair
of detectors corresponds to a particular measurement basis, in this the rectilinear
and diagonal bases denoted by "H" ,"V" , "D" and "A". Pth corresponds to the the
threshold power required to make Bob’s detectors click. Eve sends a trigger pulse
encoded with the "V" state with power 2Pth and thus guarantees detector "V" clicks.
Since development of InGaAs/InP APDs has resulted in them being viable candidates
for fibre-based QKD, so have the level and sophistication of attacks against them
increased.
The most prominent implementation of the faked-state attack is performed by
blinding the APD [134, 140–142], whereby Eve renders Bob’s detectors insensitive to
single photons but still responsive to strong, trigger pulses which she uses to control
when they click. This attack provides a large focus of this thesis and will therefore be
discussed further in detail later (see section 3.2).
Eve also has a selection of other detector attacks in her arsenal with which to target
a QKD system. Due to unavoidable manufacturing and electronic deviations, Eve can
exploit the temporal difference in efficiency that arises between multiple detectors in
Bob’s set-up [143]. This can be exploited actively, using the faked state attack [143],
or more passively, whereby Eve simply controls the arrival time of Alice’s photons,
thereby making Bob more likely to register a particular bit depending on whether Eve
delays Alice’s photons or not [144]. This is shown in Fig. 2.8. She is introducing a
deviation in the detectors from their theoretical behaviour, where it is assumed that the
detection probability is independent of the bit or basis used.
An often overlooked potential loophole can present itself during the calibration
routine before key distribution takes place [145, 146]. The goal is for the users to
tune the arrival time of Alice’s photons on Bob’s detectors such that they register the
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Fig. 2.8 Detection efficiency mismatch Schematic of Bob’s receiver set-up and the
detection response of his detectors as a function of arrival time. If Eve can control the
arrival time of qubits to Bob’s setup (either the original ones sent by Alice or her own
faked states) she can bias which detector clicks.
maximum possible detection efficiency. This procedure can be exploited by Eve to
introduce a temporal mismatch in the detectors’ efficiency, thereby allowing her to
perform the aforementioned time-shift attacks once key distribution is performed.
2.4.2 Other attacks
Whilst detector attacks are often the centre of focus for security concerns, other
components in a QKD system are also vulnerable. Outside of the PNS and Trojan Horse
source-based attacks discussed earlier, the technique used for switching between signal,
decoy and vacuum states can also introduce side-channels. Typically, Lithium Niobate-
based (LiNbO3) Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZIs) are used for producing the
aforementioned states needed for performing the decoy-state technique used to protect
the users from the PNS attack. However, patterning effects that arise due to intensity
correlations between a particular pulse and its predecessor can leak information that
Eve could use [147]. Further issues due to the ambient conditions surrounding the IM
[148] can also arise. Moreover, performing decoy states by adjusting the pump current
to the laser diode used as Alice’s source does not produce pulses that completely
overlap temporally [149], opening another backdoor for Eve. Using a Sagnac intensity
modulator has been demonstrated as a solution to all of the above issues [150] but it is
yet to be used in a full QKD system or subjected to intensive security testing.
It has also been shown that Bob’s beamsplitters (BS) used for passive basis choice
can be vulnerable [151]. Current technology results in a wavelength dependence of his
BS, hence by tailoring the spectrum of her input light, Eve can control Bob’s detectors
in much the same way as a faked state attack and introduce a negligible increase in
the QBER. This attack can easily be avoided with the use of active-basis choice QKD







Fig. 2.9 Differential Phase Shift Schematic of the DPS protocol, where qubits are
encoded on the differential phase difference between subsequent pulses. PM: phase
modulator; SPD: single photon detector
2.5 Vulnerability of QKD protocols
The choice of QKD protocol can have a direct impact on Eve’s ability to control
Bob’s detectors. Due to their simplicity and widespread use, BB84 and its variants
are usually analysed when considering detector attacks, for example in the faked
state analysis illustrated in Fig. 2.7. Although the vulnerability of distributed-phase
reference protocols to faked state attacks has been examined in [152], it is useful to
analyse each scenario in detail here.
2.5.1 Differential phase shift
We first begin with the differential phase shift (DPS) protocol first proposed in [153],
refined in [20] and experimentally demonstrated in [154]. This encodes information in
the differential phase between consecutive pulses sent by Alice. An attractive feature
of the protocol is its simple implementation, as only a single basis is used, meaning
each pulse is either encoded with a 0 or π phase shift. A 0 or 1 bit then corresponds
to either no or π phase modulation respectively. Furthermore, it is inherently secure
against the photon number splitting attack, meaning Alice does not need an intensity
modulator with which to generate decoy states.
Alice therefore needs only a light source that emits photon pulses which maintain
coherence with one another, a phase modulator for encoding her qubits and finally
an attenuator to bring the pulses down to the single-photon level. Bob uses a passive
asymmetric MZI (AMZI), with the delay corresponding to the time period of Alice’s
pulses and a single-photon detector at each output port. This is schematically shown
in Fig. 2.9. He records which detector clicks and the corresponding time stamp for
each click. Bob then tells Alice his timing information and in this way they can share
a secret key.
Eve cannot perform a simple intercept-and-resend attack since she doesn’t have
access to Bob’s measurement times, meaning she can’t simply use copies of Bob and
Alice’s apparatuses. However, she can still perform her faked state attack assuming the








Fig. 2.10 Coherent One Way Schematic of the COW protocol, showing time-encoded
qubits with decoy states using pulse pairs. IM: intensity modulator; SPD: single
photon detector
detectors have a state that can be accessed where they click with a high probability with
optical power Pth and low probability with Pth/2 (for example, if they are blinded).
Let’s assume Eve wants to make detector 2 click. She sends a pulse with optical
power Pth with no phase modulation, followed by a pulse with the same power with
a π modulation. The first pulse is split at the first BS and Pth/2 travels down each
arm. The pulse travelling down the short arm is then split again as no interference is
occurring at the second BS so each detector sees an optical power of Pth/4 and neither
one clicks. In the next case, a pulse of power Pth/2 with modulation 0, which has
travelled through the long arm, interferes with a pulse of power Pth/2 and modulation
π . As these two pulses have different modulations, they both go down the arm to
detector 2 and it sees a pulse of power Pth and clicks, whereas detector sees no optical
power and doesn’t click. Therefore Eve’s attack is successful and a countermeasure
would be necessary.
2.5.2 Coherent one way
Another significant protocol worth discussing is the coherent one way protocol (COW).
This is a time-bin encoding technique first developed by a group in Geneva in [155] and
experimentally demonstrated in [17, 18]. Alice encodes her information in pulse pairs
where a pulse-vacuum or vacuum-pulse correspond to a 0 or 1 respectively. She also
uses a decoy state that consists of a pulse-pulse pair. Bob’s receiving apparatus consists
of two parts separated by a beamsplitter, where one part consists of a single-photon
detector for measuring the arrival times and thus extracting the secure bits (top arm)
and the other contains an AMZI with a detector placed at one output port (bottom arm)
and is used for monitoring the coherence for the purpose of detecting an eavesdropper.
Typically this is an unbalanced ratio where only 10% of the bits are used for measuring
the coherence [18] and is outlined in Fig. 2.10. After Bob measures Alice’s photons,
he informs her of his timing information and Alice tells Bob when she sent decoy
states allowing them to share a secure key.
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In order for Eve to perform a successful attack, she needs to have control of
both detectors. Assuming she carries out a blinding attack, she would need to send
a blinding power of 10Pblind to control each detector, where Pblind is the minimum
power required to blind an individual detector. This already presents an experimental
challenge as it requires her to have detailed knowledge of the blinding regimes such
that she ensures both Pblind and 9Pblind fall in this region.
Once under control, making the top detector click at will is possible using a power
of Pth that ensures his detectors always click. Furthermore, obtaining a correlated
set of bits with Bob is more straightforward than in BB84 as Eve does not need to
worry about the case where Bob’s detectors see Pth/2 which usually corresponds to
mismatched bases. The difficulty for her would arise in maintaining the coherence
and count rate measured by the bottom detector, particularly since she has no prior
knowledge of whether Alice has sent a decoy or signal state and would thus introduce
a mismatch after Alice and Bob have carried out their public announcements after
key exchange. Whilst this suggests that a countermeasure to blinding would not be
required, the lack of a security proof covering coherent attacks for the COW protocol
does not necessarily make it more appealing than BB84 or T12.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, a background to avalanche photodiodes in QKD was presented. The
various quenching techniques used for APDs have been explained, illustrating a
timeline of development and demonstrating the drawbacks with each method. It was
shown how Eve could exploit the operating principles in order to control the detectors,
as well as how the choice of protocol affects her ability to do so. The knowledge of
quenching techniques of APDs and their structure are important for understanding the
content of the following chapters, the first of which focuses on the best practice for
operating self-differencing APDs to mitigate the blinding attack in QKD.
Chapter 3
Minimising vulnerabilities of
self-differencing APDs through best
practice
3.1 Introduction
Single-photon detectors are one of the most critical components for QKD. Indeed, the
overall performance of a QKD system is directly related to particular characteristics
of these devices. For example, the detector dark count rate has a significant impact
on the maximum achievable distance over which QKD can be performed. However,
the particular figures depend greatly on the choice of various settings of the device.
Furthermore, choosing avalanche photodiode (APD) parameters not only affects the
performance but also the security. This chapter focuses on the best practice for
configuring a self-differencing APD in order to maintain its practical security.
3.2 Blinding
As discussed, Eve cannot perform an intercept-resend attack due to her ignorance
of the states Alice sends. A modified version, known as the faked state attack, can
succeed if she ensures Bob’s detectors only click when his basis choice is aligned with
Eve’s [133]. Practically, this means Eve must be able to have some control over his
devices such that she can make them register a count at will. The most thoroughly
explored means of performing this is by means of blinding. By rendering Bob’s
detectors insensitive to single-photons but still able to detect strong optical pulses, Eve
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can have complete control over his detectors without causing a significant increase in
the QBER. In this way she can learn all of the key and remain undetected [134].
The first demonstration of blinding was carried out on a selection of passively-
quenched APDs [140]. Such an attack works by bringing the device below its break-
down voltage, such that it is no longer sensitive to single photons. By shining strong
light onto the detector, a large photocurrent is generated. Due to the existence of the
large bias resistor which performs quenching, a large voltage drop is introduced and
the device enters linear mode. By sustaining this level of current with a continuous
wave (CW) laser, the bias remains below breakdown and the device is continuously
quenched. This is a fundamental concept and is central to a large portion of blinding
attacks.
Other techniques for forcing the APD into linear mode have also been explored.
One of these is thermal blinding [156], which arises due to the fact that bright light
required for blinding would also cause a heating of the device. As a result of the
breakdown voltage’s temperature dependence [68] (0.1 V/K is typical, see Fig. 5.4),
when made hot enough, the device would cease to be operating in Geiger mode once
more, and again be no longer sensitive to single photons. This occurs due to the
increased lattice vibrations, also known as phonon scattering [157], as a result of a
higher temperature which causes an increase in probability that a hole (or electron)
collides with the lattice and loses its energy. As a result, there is a drop in probability
that the hole gains enough energy to trigger ionisation of a new electron-hole pair.
Therefore, in order to ensure the hole has enough energy, the electric field must be
larger than the initial value of the breakdown voltage.
A more extreme case of using bright light to attack detectors is to use a laser so
powerful that it actually damages the APD and thus introduces vulnerabilities in the
system [158]. The authors of [158] were able to cause the same kind of blinding
as in [141], whereby the detector is insensitive to single photons but still able to
detect moderately bright light by damaging the detector. The advantage of this is that
once blinding has been achieved the APD no longer needs to be controlled through
illumination by Eve. Naturally this attack can easily be detected if Bob re-characterises
his devices but it still opens the door for Eve, who could use such a technique to
possibly target any ‘watchdog’ detectors used as security countermeasures [159].
Although a significant body of work demonstrating blinding has been published
[134, 141, 142], it is important to make the distinction between a genuine loophole and
simply inappropriate operation. This point was first made in [160] and later expanded
upon in [161]. With regards to gated APDs, the detectors of choice for the system
under scrutiny (IDQuantique’s Clavis2), two main criteria are clear:
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1. Do not use a high-impedance bias-resistor
2. Set the discrimination appropriately
Additionally, since Eve’s blinding power is typically many orders of magnitude
greater than that used by Alice for sending her single photons, monitoring the APDs’
photocurrent is also an effective measure. The most prominent demonstrations of
blinding [134, 141] violate one or both of the above criteria. Furthermore, at least one
study published after [161] shows blinding on an APD operated with an inappropriately
high discrimination level [142, 162], thereby highlighting the need for further work on
this subject.
3.3 SD blinding
As discussed earlier, due to the cancellation of the SD, it is impossible to discriminate
two consecutive, identical avalanches. In theory, this effect can allow Eve to completely
blind the detector with a moderate optical power. By illuminating the APD with CW
light of sufficient intensity, it is possible to deterministically produce an avalanche
within each gate, thereby forcing a complete cancellation of avalanche signals and
bringing the detection count rate to zero [162, 163]. Assuming identical avalanche
amplitudes, the detection probability (Pdet) and count rate (CR) can be simulated using
Pdet = (1− e−µη) · e−µη (3.1)
CR = f Pdet (3.2)
where µ is the photon flux per pulse and η is the single photon detection efficiency.
The first term of Eq. 3.1 is the probability that an avalanche occurs in a gate. The
following term is then the probability of no avalanche occurring in the following gate.
It can be seen that as µη becomes very large, the second term, and therefore the whole
expression, tends to zero.
We can estimate the optical power required to blind a conventional gated detector
with the mechanism described in section 3.2. The actual excess voltage whilst the
APD is under illumination can be described with the following
V ′ex =Vex − I ·Rbias (3.3)
where I is the generated photocurrent. This shows that if both I and Rbias are reasonably
large, it is possible to make V ′ex zero or negative. This highlights the importance of
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making Rbias as small as possible. However removing the bias resistor does not cause
this to be zero as an intrinsic resistance exists in the circuit which we measure to be
approximately 1 kΩ (see section 3.5).
Assuming an excess voltage of 4.4 V, an incident optical power of larger than 4.4
mW is required to bring the APD out of Geiger mode. By examining Eq. 3.1, we can
see that an incident optical power of just under 60 nW is sufficient to blind a 1 GHz
gated SD detector (assuming a pulsed laser of the same repetition frequency and a
detection efficiency of 10 %), nearly 5 orders of magnitude smaller. Since the required
optical power for blinding an SD detector is much smaller, it makes detection of an
eavesdropper through monitoring of the photocurrent [161] less straightforward.
The body of work surrounding attacks on QKD systems is vast and beyond the
scope of this thesis. As such, I refer the reader to a recent review article for more
information [164].
3.4 Experimental setup
To test the effectiveness of SD blinding, a fiber-coupled InGaAs/InP APD was chosen.
It was thermo-electrically cooled to -30 ◦C as this is an often used temperature for
QKD experiments where the dark counts are reasonably low. Generic electronics in
the form of a source measure unit (SMU) and pulse generator coupled to a bias tee
are used to provide the SD-APD with the DC and AC biases, respectively. A variable
quenching or biasing resistor is applied in the biasing circuit for later convenience and
its initial value is set to zero. A continuous wave distributed feedback (DFB) C-band
laser was used to illuminate the APD and the output was amplified by two 20 dB
amplifiers. A schematic of the set-up used is shown in Fig. 3.1 (a).
Typically, APD avalanches are discriminated with either specially designed photon
counters and/or front-end electronics and then counted with field-programmable gate
array (FPGA) electronics or the same photon counter [13, 39]. These are well-suited
to QKD applications when count rates are relatively low. However, when high optical
powers are applied to the device for characterising blinding, the count rates become far
greater and can exceed the maximum ratings that such counters can cope with. Indeed,
in this study, several solutions for measuring count rates were tested, but they either
resulted in saturation of the photon counter or prohibitively long measurement times.
As a result, a 16 GHz oscilloscope was used to extract individual waveforms and these
were then discriminated by a purpose-built LabView programme. Such a technique
proved able to cope with the large count rates (up to 1 GCounts/s) at reasonable speeds
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Fig. 3.1 Setting up the APD (a) Setup for characterising the self-differencing detector
under bright illumination. LD: laser diode; VOA: variable optical attenuator; SD:
self-differencer; Rq: quenching resistor; SMU: source measure unit. (b) An SD output
waveform showing a single avalanche rising above the capacitive response residual.
(c) Detection efficiency and dark count rate as a function of the discrimination level.
18 mV is marked as our chosen appropriate discrimination level.
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with the added bonus of providing a more direct control over the discrimination level
used for the counting of avalanches.
Recapping from section 2.3.3, under fast gating, an APD produces a strong capac-
itive response which can be much stronger than the avalanche signals arising from
photon detections. To suppress such a response and enable photon detection, the SD
circuit splits the output of the APD in half, shifting one of those halves by a gating
period and then recombining the two halves in order to cancel the strong capacitive
response of the detector [131]. Fig. 3.1 (b) shows a typical waveform of an SD output,
with an avalanche signal rising above the residual, uncancelled background of the
detector capacitive response.
When first setting up the detector it is important to carry out a series of steps
in order to systematically arrive at the most appropriate way of operating it. This
prescription is given as follows:
• Determine the APD’s breakdown voltage. This is taken as the point at which
the generated current exceeds 10 µA [1] when the APD is biased with the
DC signal only and without optical illumination. This was carried out using a
source measure unit (SMU) by applying a current to measure the voltage. The
breakdown voltage was found to be 51.8 V.
• Set the initial DC and AC biases. The initial DC bias is set at 51.6 V, just below
the breakdown voltage, using the SMU in voltage mode. An AC signal applied
using an amplified signal from a pulse generator is set at a sufficient level to
enable single photon avalanches, i.e., approximately 5-10 V.
• Set a coarse discrimination level. This is set by lowering the DC bias such that
the APD never experiences any excess bias and therefore does not produce any
single-photon or dark counts. We use a value 10 V below our initial DC, i.e.
41.6 V. Under this condition, the SD output contains only the background signal.
The coarse discrimination level is set as the lowest level with which the counting
electronics produces a count rate of zero such that all of the background is
neglected. This coarse discrimination level can then be used when varying the
DC and AC signals to find the optimum detector characteristics as in the next
step.
• Optimise the biasing conditions. This involves adjusting the DC and AC levels
around V (1)DC and V
(1)
AC to optimise the detector performance, such as detection
efficiency, dark count rate and afterpulse probability. The detailed procedure for
this step can be found in a previous publication [68]. We refer to the optimised
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bias values as V (2)DC and V
(2)
AC . For this study, we chose values of 51.6 V and 4.6 V
respectively. These bias condition result in an excess voltage of V 0ex = 2.1 V
over its breakdown voltage.
• Set the final discrimination level under the optimal biases of V (2)DC and V
(2)
AC . This
step is necessary because the capacitance of an APD is bias dependent and so
is the uncancelled capacitive signal background. Under dark conditions, the
detector count rate is measured as a function of the discrimination level. The
point where the count rate changes dramatically signals the detection of the noise
floor. Therefore, one should choose a discrimination level just above this to
ensure an optimal detection efficiency while rejecting all uncancelled capacitive
background contributing to the dark counts.
Figure 3.1 (c) shows the detector efficiency and dark count rate as a function of the
discrimination level after the values of V (2)DC and V
(2)
AC have been chosen. The dark count
rate shows a kink at the discrimination level of 16 mV, indicating the threshold above
which the dark avalanches have replaced the capacitive residuals to be the dominant
contribution to the measured dark count rate. While we could use this level, we set the
discrimination level about 10% higher at 18 mV in order to have a tolerance margin.
The detector is measured to have a single photon detection efficiency of 26% for
pulsed light and a dark count rate of ∼23 kHz for this discrimination level using a
pulsed laser with repetition frequency of 15.625 MHz (1/64 GHz). Setting a higher
discrimination leads to a lower detection efficiency and dark count rate. More detri-
mentally, this can also favour blinding, as we will show later, and therefore goes
against the best practice of using SD-APDs.
For the purpose of this study, we use a relatively rough estimate for the detection





where CRill is the total illuminated count rate, CRdark is the total non-illuminated count
rate, Flaser is the laser repetition frequency and µ is the flux in photons per pulse. This
uses a general measurement of the overall count rate, therefore it overestimates the
detection efficiency as it includes afterpulses as legitimate counts. A more accurate
technique is given in [95] however as characterisation is not the main focus of this
study, the method using Eq. 3.4 is sufficient for our purposes.
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3.5 SD APD under strong illumination
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Fig. 3.2 Effect of discrimination level on APD count rates Detector count rates
as a function of incident optical power from a continuous-wave C-band laser diode
with different discrimination levels. The variable quenching resistor is set to 0 Ω.
The dashed line represents Eq. 3.2 with a constant η = 0.028 for continuous-wave
illumination.
To examine the blinding behaviour of the APD, we subject our detector to continuous-
wave illumination from the laser diode. Fig. 3.2 shows the detector count rate as a
function of the incident optical power for various discrimination levels. We first look at
the result obtained with the appropriate discrimination level of 18 mV. In the weak illu-
mination regime (≤10 nW), the detector behaves like a typical single photon detector.
Its count rate is initially dominated by dark count noise, then increases linearly due to
detection of incoming photons before saturation at about 4 nW. Beyond saturation, the
detector exhibits a count rate plateau between 10 nW to 2 µW while Eq. 3.2 predicts
an immediate, sharp drop in the count rate. When the optical power is greater than
2 µW, the count rate starts to fall noticeably because of the SD cancellation between
neighbouring gates. However, the fall only creates a shallow dip with a local minimum
of 21.4 MHz at ∼ 0.23 mW. We do not observe detector blinding, i.e., the count rate
falling to zero for the incident power up to 7 mW.
By increasing the discrimination level, both the detection efficiency and saturation
count rate become lower, as a higher discrimination level rejects a larger fraction of
self-differenced signals. More strikingly, the count rate dip becomes deeper. At 26 mV,
the detector registers a zero count rate with an incident power between 0.1 and 2.5 mW.
The existence of this blinding gap makes Eve’s blinding attack feasible, and this leads
to an unsurprising conclusion that an inappropriately-set SD detector is vulnerable,
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just like its low speed counterparts [161]. We note that the minimum blinding power
is still more than three orders of magnitude larger than that predicted by Eq.3.2.
To understand the origin of the discrepancy, we perform another experiment by
varying the resistance value of the quenching resistor in the DC path of the detector
biasing circuit. While use of a quenching resistor is common for free-running APD
detectors [165], it is unnecessary for gated APDs because an avalanche is automatically
quenched after a detection gate.
For the purpose of obtaining an accurate value for the bias resistance, Rbias, of the
APD in Eq. 3.3, the series resistance of the APD and electronics was measured. This
was done by applying a small forward bias using the SMU with the AC from the pulse
generator switched off and the bias resistance set to 0 and measuring the generated
current. By calculating the gradient once the current starts to increase, the inverse of
this results in the intrinsic resistance of the APD and the rest of the circuit, shown in
Fig. 3.3. This was measured to be approximately 1.0 kΩ.
















Fig. 3.3 APD intrinsic resistance APD current measured under forward biasing
conditions. By determining the gradient of the final three points, the intrinsic series
resistance can be extracted and was found to be approximately 1 kΩ.
Figure 3.4 (a) shows the count rate dependencies for different resistance values
together with that obtained without a quenching resistor. Here, we choose to use
the ill-set discrimination level of 26 mV to enhance the blinding effect. A blinding
gap exists for all resistance values, but the gap shifts to lower power regions as the
resistance value increases. With 400 kΩ, the blinding power is just 100 nW, which is
three orders of magnitude lower than the 0 kΩ case.
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Fig. 3.4 The impact of the quenching resistor Detector behaviour with different
quenching resistor values. (a) Detector count rate as a function of the incident optical
power at an ill-set discrimination level of 26 mV; (b) Measured photocurrent and
calculated voltage drop in the detector bias. The same colour codes are used in (a)
and (b) to represent different quenching resistor values.
Figure 3.4 (b) shows the measured detector photocurrent using the SMU (dashed
lines) as a function of the incident optical power. Flowing through the resistive
components, including both the quenching resistor and the APD itself, the photocurrent
creates a voltage drop and therefore lowers the detector reverse bias, see Fig. 3.4 (b)
(solid lines). This has two direct effects. First, it reduces the avalanche probability (η).
The higher the incident power, the lower the excess bias and avalanche probability.
This explains why the detector requires a much higher optical power to become blinded
than that expected from Eq.(3.2) and the formation of the count rate plateau. Second,
it lowers the avalanche signal amplitude and consequently the differential signal
between adjacent detector gates. A larger quenching resistor makes the detector excess
bias drop faster, as shown in Eq. 3.3. The larger the value of the circuit resistance,
which incorporates the bias and APD internal resistances, the smaller the required
photocurrent to reduce the excess bias, Vex, to zero, which results in an earlier blinding.
The voltage drop corresponding to blinding is marked in Fig. 3.4 (b) with empty
squares.
A third effect caused by the photocurrent can explain the count rate recovery shown
in Fig. 3.4 (a). We mark in the figure the voltage values corresponding to the recovery
point after each blinding gap with an empty circle. The voltage drop values are all
around 5 V. This observation provides a key to understanding the count rate recoveries,
as we explain here. A SD circuit suppresses the detector capacitive response but
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will always leave a residual background due to its finite performance. The amplitude
of such background is proportional to the APD capacitance, see Fig. 3.1 (b), which
depends on the thickness of its depletion layer that is reverse-bias dependent [166]. A
voltage drop leads to an increase in the capacitance and hence the amplitude of the
residual background, which will eventually overcome the discrimination level and
revive the counting rate. This explanation agrees with the count rate reaching 1 GHz
for all quenching resistor values, see Fig. 3.4 (a).
To provide further support to this argument, we measure the APD capacitive
amplitude under dark conditions before the SD circuit as we reduce the DC bias
applied to the device. This was performed by varying the DC on the SMU and using
an in-built function of the oscilloscope to measure the amplitude.
As shown in Fig. 3.5, we find that at the point of recovery, the response has
increased in amplitude by 25% of its original value where there is a bias reduction
of 4.5 V. This quantity of bias reduction can be realised using 2.3 mW of optical
illumination for the case of the biasing resistor being set at zero. Due to the imperfect
cancellation of the SD, the increased capacitance of the APD translates to a larger
background after the SD circuit. This measurement result also justifies our choice of
the appropriate discrimination level being only 10% above the capacitive background
(see our previous discussion), as this can easily be overcome by such a dramatic
increase in the residual capacitive signal. We note that the measured increase of the
capacitive signal is applicable to all fast-gated APDs [130, 131, 167–171].
With both sides of each blinding gap accounted for, it is natural to understand
the gradual disappearance of the blinding gap when lowering the discrimination level
(Fig. 3.2). In a “blinding" gap, the SD output signal is made up of two components
with opposing trends. The differential output of the SD circuit becomes smaller as
the incident power increases, because each detector gate is more likely to produce an
avalanche with a saturated amplitude or the amplitude itself is reduced by the lowered
excess bias. Concurrently, the residual capacitive background gains strength due to
the reduction of the APD reverse bias. The latter can overcome an appropriately
set discrimination level before the photon-induced signal falls completely under that
discrimination level.
The above explanation is distinctively different from gain modulation that has
prevented conventional gated APDs from blinding [161]. Although still present,
the modulation of the photocurrent by detector gating is periodical and considerably
weaker than the capacitive response and therefore its contribution to the self-differencer
output is negligible. Laser intensity fluctuations can also produce self-differencing
signals that can overcome a detector discrimination level at high illumination power,
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Fig. 3.5 APD capacitive response measured before the self-differencing circuit as
a function of the DC bias reduction below its normal value. We mark the point
corresponding to the count rate recovery as shown in Fig. 3.4.
in particular when pulsed optical excitation is used [162]. However, this mechanism
does not play the dominant role in our case using continuous-wave illumination. First,
it is incompatible with our observation in Fig. 3.4 that the recovery power can vary
over three orders of magnitude for the same detector and blinding laser, with the
lowest recovery power being merely 2 µW. Second, the intensity fluctuation should
produce a maximum count rate that is half of the gating frequency, while we observed
a maximum count rate of 1 GHz.
3.6 Best-practice criteria
We propose below a list of best-practice criteria to be followed in either designing or
operating self-differencing detectors to mitigate blinding attacks.
• Monitor the photocurrent. The blinding current is still on the order of 1 mA,
which can easily be sensed using a resistor of 1 kΩ.
• Avoid use of a quenching or biasing resistor of high resistance value, because
it can provide overly strong feedback to the excess bias and therefore severely
limit the maximum count rate. We recommend a value less than 50 kΩ when a
biasing resistor is desired to limit the current for protecting the APD detector.
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This resistance value will still allow a maximum count rate of over 30 MCounts/s
and have a negligible effect on the QKD key rate.
• Set an appropriate discrimination level. This not only gives an optimal detection
efficiency but also enables protection by sensing the excess voltage reduction
through the residual capacitive background.
• Use different resistance values in a QKD system that contains more than one
detector. A careful choice of resistance values can prevent an overlap of the
detectors’ blinding gaps, see Fig. 3.4, when their discrimination levels are
inadvertently ill-set.
• Verify whether the capacitive response residual can overcome the detector
discrimination level when the APD’s reverse bias is lowered below its breakdown.
If not, detune the self-differencing circuit slightly and/or re-set the detector
discrimination level.
Compliance with the above criteria does not introduce a significant increase in
system complexity nor a reduction in the secure key rate. This is an advantage as
compared with the countermeasure of monitoring the detector efficiency [172], which
offers a higher level of assurance but at the expense of the system simplicity and
key rate. We note that the applicability of the proposed criteria is not limited to
SD detectors, but extendable to other types of high-speed gated APD detectors, as
discussed earlier. They can all improve their resilience from the negative feedback of
the photocurrent, despite their use of different signal cancellation techniques.
3.7 Conclusion
In summary, we have experimentally studied the behaviour of an InGaAs self-differencing
detector under bright illumination from a continuous-wave laser. We have shown that
the intrinsic, negative feedback of the photocurrent has prevented not only an early
blinding but also a complete blinding at very high attacking powers by strengthening
the residual capacitive background. We have shown the importance of setting an
appropriate discrimination level as this has a direct impact on the detector’s behaviour
under Eve’s blinding attack. Our findings allow us to outline a set of best-practice
criteria to ensure the most secure conditions to operate these detectors in QKD systems.
Whilst these steps can ensure the practical security of the device, this is not a complete
countermeasure. Furthermore, this theme has been briefly explored for gated APDs,
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yet these detectors are still often inappropriately operated, hence it would be desirable
to ensure security of SD APDs even when they are subjected to similar misuse.
Chapter 4
Using intensity modulation to prevent
blinding
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, mitigating blinding of an APD was approached by establish-
ing the best practice for operating these devices. Whilst it was shown as effective
for the device studied, this can only establish practical security, largely due to the
deviation between APDs and attacking lasers. In order to come closer to obtaining an
information-theoretic secure measure, more needs to be done. This chapter will con-
centrate on how an intensity modulator can used as an effective measure for eliminating
blinding.
4.2 Previous countermeasures to detector blinding
A brief survey of blinding attacks targeting APDs has been presented in Section 3.2.
Whilst the literature surrounding the finding of security loopholes in QKD systems is
extensive, considerably less work is dedicated to presenting convincing countermea-
sures to these backdoors. This is perhaps a result of the difficulty in definitely proving
a countermeasure is effective; indeed countermeasures can easily be refuted either
because all attacks (known or unknown) are not considered or that an all-powerful Eve
could subvert the countermeasure using, say, a quantum memory, which is beyond
currently technology.
Countermeasures can be broadly divided into two categories, active and passive.
In a passive approach, the legitimate QKD users (Alice and Bob) monitor in real
time the device parameters that change under Eve’s attack [172, 173]. In an active
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approach, they add extra guarding components to thaw Eve’s attempt [34, 174]. Using
the Trojan-horse attack [33, 175] as an example, Alice and Bob can employ either
a watchdog detector to actively detect Eve’s presence [176] or a combination of an
optical filter, attenuator and isolator to passively prevent Eve’s light from reaching the
encoding devices [34].
From the point of view of APD blinding, the most intuitive measure to combat
blinding is an passive one and is to monitor the photocurrent generated by the APD
[161]. As the optical powers needed for blinding gated APDs can be many orders
of magnitude greater than the power used by Alice, the APD would generate a sig-
nificantly larger current. However, as pointed out in [177], defining a magnitude
of photocurrent which is a signature of Eve is problematic and ideally it should be
incorporated into a security proof to guarantee the security. Indeed, this is a thorny
issue and discussions surrounding blinding, distinguishing between incorrect opera-
tion and genuine loopholes, and countermeasures have been somewhat contentious
[141, 142, 160, 161, 177–183].
Active countermeasures have also been explored, often involving manipulation
of the APD gates. By randomly removing APD gates and essentially bringing the
detection efficiency in those gates to zero, Eve would be caught as she would place
clicks where there would be none in her absence [180].
A further option proposed has been from the point of view of modifying the design
of the electronics [174]. This involved splitting the signal before the self-differencer
splitter, such that a separate path could essentially be used for monitoring for blinding.
The large optical powers required for blinding would mean that a comparator in
this additional path could detect clicks without the need for a cancellation scheme.
However, the attenuation in signal as a result of the second splitter has not been
characterised and could degrade the signal-to-noise ratio, potentially reducing the
secure key rate.
4.3 Modulating Eve’s blinding laser
Here, we propose taking preemptive action against blinding by placing an intensity
modulator (IM) in front of the receiver’s measurement apparatus. The use of low
extinction ratio modulation will not severely attenuate the incoming quantum signal,
but the IM will create sufficient modulation in the detector’s photocurrent, which
is detectable by SD circuitry and discrimination electronics. We experimentally
demonstrate this method on an SD InGaAs APD.
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This idea is similar in spirit to the random variation of an APD’s detection efficiency,
suggested and partially implemented in [180], which was shown to be ineffective
against a refined Eve’s attack [142]. However, our proposal contains some notable
differences. An APD endowed with an SD circuit sets a more challenging target to the
eavesdropper. In fact, Eve has to send sequential light pulses with identical intensity to
cause blinding. Any small deviation from this condition is likely to cause a detection
event with an associated 50% quantum bit error rate (QBER). At the same time, a
long sequence of bright optical pulses generates a high photocurrent which is easily
detectable [160]. When an IM with random modulation is added on top of this already
compelling situation, the constraints for Eve become extremely stringent. In particular,
we found no room for blinding in our experiment.
4.4 Blinding attacks and countermeasures
As outlined in Chapter 2, single photon sensitivity of an APD relies on having an
electrical excess bias above its breakdown voltage to enable avalanche multiplication
of a single photo-carrier. In the blinding attacks, Eve erodes this excess by inducing
an electrical current flowing through the biasing circuit [161] or heating up the device
to raise its breakdown voltage [156]. These attacks are realised through injecting
a strong laser signal into Bob’s module through the quantum channel and making
both of his detectors blind, i.e., insensitive to single photons. At this point, Eve
performs a modified intercept-resend attack to take control of Bob’s detectors. She
measures the state prepared by Alice and re-sends a suitably prepared faked state
encoded in a strong optical pulse. This will then trigger a detector count only when
Bob chooses a measurement basis that is identical to Eve’s. In this attack, Eve can
gain full information about the final key [133].
Consider an APD detector operated in Geiger mode with an excess voltage of V 0ex,
as shown in Fig. 4.1 (a). To completely erode this excess and blind the detector, Eve





where Rbias, Rapd and Rs are the resistance values for the biasing resistor, the APD
itself and the sensing resistor, respectively. In a usual setup, Rbias = 0 and the current
is determined mainly by the value of Rapd. Its typical value is on the order of 1 mA,
see Fig. 4.1 (b). This large current, together with the gain modulation effect by the




















Fig. 4.1 Outline of blinding and its countermeasure (a) Schematic of a biasing
scheme for a gated APD. VDC : DC bias component; VAC: AC bias component; Rbias:
biasing resistor; Rapd: APD internal resistance; Rs: sensing resistor. (b) Reduction in
the excess bias due to photocurrent. (c) Schematic of the measure against blinding. IM:
intensity modulator; QRNG: quantum random number generator; SD: Self-Differencer.
(d) Effect of the intensity modulation on the SD photocurrent in presence of bright
light inputted by Eve.
detector gating, has previously enabled gated-APDs to avoid the blinding attack when
their discrimination levels are appropriately set [161].
Here we propose a different measure, schematically shown in Fig. 4.1 (c). We
insert an IM, driven by a quantum random number generator (QRNG), in front of
the optical fibre input of the APD detector and an SD circuit after its electrical signal
output. The SD circuit splits the APD output into two equal components, delays
one of them, and then combines the two signals differentially, see Fig. 4.1 (d). The
positive peaks of the resulting photocurrent can then be detected by the discrimination
electronics.
The IM acts as an optical shutter and stops any incoming light for a short duration
at random times. Under normal conditions, i.e., in the absence of Eve, this would cause
a decrease in the counts seen by Bob every time the IM is activated. Correspondingly,
the resulting avalanche current would exhibit a waveform containing a positive current
peak followed by a negative dip. On the contrary, if Eve sends her blinding pulses
into Bob’s module, the IM’s activation would increase the counts seen by Bob, due
to the SD effect, and the resulting photocurrent would exhibit a negative current dip
followed by a positive peak. Because this outcome is distinctively different from that
under normal conditions, it represents a clear signature of Eve’s presence.
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Fig. 4.2 Experimental setup to investigate intensity modulation as a countermea-
sure against blinding. Pu.G.: Pulse Generator; Pa.G.: Pattern Generator; SMU:
Source Measure Unit; LD: Laser Diode; VOA: Variable Optical Attenuator; IM:
Intensity Modulator; APD: Avalanche Photodiode; SD: Self-Differencer.
Even without correlating Bob’s counts to the IM’s activation times, the presence of
the IM and SD circuitry make it possible to restore the APD’s count rate and prevent
its blinding. This is a simple consequence of the fact that, irrespective of the polarity of
the photocurrent, the positive peak is always well above the detector’s discrimination
level, for a detector that has been correctly set up. So, for simplicity, we decided to
not take advantage in this work of the “fine-grained” signatures based on correlating
the counts with the IM or based on the avalanche’s polarity and focus rather on the
“coarse-grained” signature represented by the APD’s counts. The analysis of the whole
statistics available to Bob is left for future studies and can only reinforce the results
presented here.
4.5 Experimental setup
To investigate the efficacy of the proposed measure, we modify the experimental setup
from Chapter 2, shown in Fig. 4.2, which includes an IM and removes the bias resistor.
Unless otherwise stated, the experimental condition are as before.
We use two variable optical attenuators (denoted as a single VOA in Fig. 4.2) to
provide a 120 dB intensity variation range and a LiNbO3 intensity modulator driven
by a pattern generator to modulate the optical power.
We note that under this operating condition, specifically an appropriately chosen
discrimination level of 18mV and no bias resistor, it is not possible for Eve to blind the
detector using continuous-wave illumination because the increasing APD capacitive
response is sufficient to counter Eve’s blinding effort as shown in Chapter 2 and [184].
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Fig. 4.3 Blinding of an inappropriately operated APD The detector count rate in
the case of an inappropriately high discrimination level and associated photocurrent
as a function of the incident optical power. Count rate and photocurrent can be
simultaneously measured and pose stringent constraints on Eve’s actions.
4.6 Effect of the intensity modulation on the count rate
We first demonstrate once more the experimental condition under which the SD-
APD can be blinded (previously shown in Fig. 3.2). By deliberately setting the
discrimination level inappropriately high, at 26 mV, we measure the count rate of the
SD-APD as a function of incident optical power measured directly after the IM. Here,
the RF input to the IM is disabled and its DC bias is adjusted to have a maximum
transmission. Figure 4.3 shows the count rate and photocurrent as a function of
the incident optical power. The detector exhibits a blinding gap between 300 µW
and 3 mW, within which the detector count rate falls to zero. Such a blinding gap
enables Eve to gain complete control of the detector. The photocurrent follows the
count rate and grows linearly before the count rate saturation, and then grows sub-
linearly (100 nW – 1µW) before becoming quasi-linear with the incident optical power
(> 1µW). In the blinding gap, the photocurrent is measured to exceed 1 mA.
Such a large photocurrent offers an opportunity to close the blinding gap by
modulating the intensity of the attacking signal. As illustrated earlier with Fig. 4.1 (d),
intensity modulation creates a dip in the photocurrent. The SD circuit converts each
dip to a positive peak which can trigger the detector discrimination circuit when there
is sufficient modulation depth. A random pattern produces photocurrent dips at a
rate that is 1/4 of the signal clock rate. For simplicity we simulate this rate in our
experiment by applying an RF signal to the IM using a repetitive modulation pattern
“0001", which we label as “1/4" modulation. We set the RF amplitude to 4 V (Vπ ),
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achieving half-wave modulation and an intensity extinction ratio of 23 dB. This pattern
carves a 1 ns hole for every 4 ns duration in the attacking light intensity.
Using the ill-set discrimination level of 26 mV, we measure the count rate versus
the incident optical power with the result shown as black squares in Fig. 4.4 (a). The
intensity modulation causes distinctively different count rate behaviour for higher
optical power when compared with the case without intensity modulation (open
squares). The count rate stays above 250 MHz from 100 nW to 7.5 mW, without any
sign of it falling. Despite the high discrimination level, the IM successfully removes
the former SD-APD’s blinding gap.
We attribute the closure of the blinding gap to the applied intensity modulation.
To illustrate this, we compare two SD-APD output waveforms recorded using a
16 GHz oscilloscope under vastly different optical powers. In the single photon
counting regime, the APD produces a positive, current spike and therefore its SD
output becomes a positive spike followed by its negative copy 1 ns afterwards, see
waveform 1 in Fig. 4.4 (b). With an optical power of 1 mW, the SD-APD output
waveform reverses its polarity (waveform 2) because the intensity modulation carves
a hole in the photocurrent, instead of a current spike for a single-photon induced
avalanche. The signal level is about 9 times as strong as the single-photon induced
avalanche, and can therefore overcome the detector discrimination level. For the case
of 1/4 modulation, the count rate saturates close to 750 MHz, which can be explained
by having two ripples after the main avalanche peak in Fig. 4.4 (b) overcoming the
discrimination threshold as well.
Figure 4.4 (c) plots the signal level of the main positive peak extracted with in-built
scope functionality induced by the IM as a function of incident optical power. Over the
incident power spanning over 4 orders of magnitude between 0.7 µW and 7 mW, the
IM induced signal has a significant margin to overcome the discrimination level, even
though it was inappropriately set. At an optical power of 1 µW , where the count rate
with no IM (open squares in Fig. 4.4 (a)) begins to fall, the signal level in Fig. 4.4 (c)
is over 50 mV and continues to increase in amplitude to over 300 mV at an optical
power of greater than 1 mW. Within the power range Eve needs for blinding, each
intensity modulation is guaranteed to produce at least one detector count. This is
in agreement with our experiment using sparser modulation patterns, as shown in
Fig. 4.4 (a). A sparser modulation results in a proportionally lower bottom-out count
rate in the blinding gap.
The significant margin in the signal level shown in Fig. 4.4 (c) offers room to relax
the requirement on the IM’s modulation contrast, thus minimising the loss that the IM
would introduce. This would also be beneficial as the halfwave modulation requires
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Fig. 4.4 Effectiveness of the intensity modulator (a) APD count rates as a function
of incident optical power with different modulations applied to the intensity modulator.
An RF amplitude of 4 V is used to produce half-wave modulation and a modulation
extinction ratio of 23 dB. (b) The SD output recorded by the oscilloscope at points (1)
and (2) in (a) with the attacking laser being modulated by a “1/32" pattern. (c) Signal
level of the main positive peak as a function of optical power.
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an RF voltage of 4 V, which is undesirably greater than the value of 3 V that is easily
reachable with low cost and low power-consumption semiconductor integrated circuits.
The DC is first set to maximum transmission such that the extinction is minimised,
as shown in Fig. 4.5 (a). The arrival time of the modulated optical power is also
optimised by adjusting the delay on the pulse generator driving the IM and maximising
the amplitude of the corresponding APD waveform, as shown in Fig. 4.5 (b).




































Fig. 4.5 Calibrating the intensity modulator (a) Optical power as a function of IM
DC with the RF signal turned off. (b) APD signal amplitude as a function of delay.
With the IM calibrated, we determine the lowest modulation contrast by measuring
the count rate probability as a function of the RF signal amplitude applied to the IM.
Here, the modulation frequency is 1/128 of 1 GHz and the incident optical power is
1 mW. As shown in Fig. 4.6, a modulation signal with amplitude 0.3 V can always
induce at least one detector count. More counts are possible due to the ripples in
the output waveform also overcoming the discrimination threshold. This RF level
corresponds to an intensity contrast of 0.06 dB, calculated using the equation [185]










The number of counts increases above unity at a modulation amplitude higher
than 1.5 V because the amplitude of the signal ripple (see Fig. 4.4 (b)) rises above the
discrimination level.
4.7 Intensity modulation to prevent blinding
In this section we discuss how the IM represents a potential countermeasure to the blind-
ing attack. We also neglect any artificial additions used to facilitate post-processing
or software implemention, such as dead time, which may be exploited by Eve with a
modified attack [186]. We assume that the IM is driven by a true random generator,
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Fig. 4.6 Required contrast to mitigate blinding. APD counts per IM activation and
IM contrast as a function of the AC signal driving the IM, for a constant incident optical
power of 1 mW and a modulation pattern 1/128. We note that the APD discrimination
level is deliberately set too high (26 mV) to enable blinding when the IM is switched
off.
so Eve cannot deterministically predict the modulation effect and prepare her blind-
ing pulses accordingly. In active basis selection schemes, as in the most commonly
implemented BB84 protocol, Bob already contains a random number generator. This
can be operated at twice the clock frequency and thereby provide random numbers
for both basis selection and intensity modulation and thus reducing the complexity of
the countermeasure. Removing the need for an additional random number generator
therefore does not open additional side-channels.
We also consider a sufficient modulation depth to ensure a strong signal difference
between modulated and unmodulated gates, which guarantees the occurrence of a
detector count, as we have shown. The synchronisation of the IM pulses, as well
as the differential delay of the SD circuit, must be carefully chosen such that the
counts by IM activation fall within the acceptance time window of the QKD system.
Finally, a spectral filter should be applied in the QKD receiver to limit Eve’s choice of
wavelength and ensure that the modulation effect on Eve’s attacking signal takes place.
Whilst most intensity modulators are polarisation sensitive, we note that placing the
IM directly before the detectors makes this irrelevant. In phase-encoded systems, such
as in ref [19], the interferometer at Bob contains an electronic polarization controller
(EPC) and a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS) which ensure that the polarization is
fixed once it arrives at the detectors. For polarization encoded schemes, such as that
investigated in [134], a PBS is also used, thereby ensuring the same effect. Therefore,
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regardless of what polarization Eve might send into Bob, the received polarization at
the detectors always remains the same.
The main security observation is that each IM-induced electrical signal overcomes
the discrimination level and deterministically generates at least one detector count.
These counts have equal probabilities of contributing a correct or incorrect bit in
the sifted key, thus generating an overall 50% QBER. Therefore we can choose the
probability to activate the IM, PIM, such that the resulting QBER in the presence of
Eve exceeds the security tolerance of the protocol. If this happens, the protocol is
aborted and no insecure key is distilled.
To decide the correct value for PIM, let us consider the BB84 protocol [9], which
features a security tolerance of 11%. Suppose first that PIM = 25%. In this case, we
have a guarantee that if Eve always launches her attack, Bob will see at least 1 click
in 4 input pulses, which would cause a QBER, Qb, equal to or larger than 12.5%. In
this case the key rate is zero, R(Qb) = 0. If Eve works in “burst-mode”, she cannot
do better than in the previous scenario. On the N preparations effected by Alice, she
could intercept-and-resend Nb consecutive blinding signals in bursts and mount her
attack only on these bursts, while blocking the remaining N −Nb quantum signals.
Even in this case, the IM would guarantee the final QBER to be above 12.5%, causing
zero key rate. Moreover, at the beginning of the train of blinding pulses prepared by
Eve, the SD effect would cause one additional count in Bob’s detectors, making this
scenario more favourable to the legitimate users. This analysis is somewhat naive
and can be considered overly conservative, possibly needlessly reducing the secure
key rate. Since Bob knows exactly when he activates the IM, he could estimate two
different QBERs, each corresponding to the IM being enabled or not. Therefore, even
if PIM = 0.001%, Bob would still measure the QBER with the IM enabled to be 50%.
On the other hand, assuming Bob has a rather crude QKD system and is unable to
distinguish between cases with the IM being enabled or not, Eve could let a fraction
of Alice’s signals pass undisturbed. In this case, Eve gets no information on the
undisturbed signals, but the resulting QBER would be smaller than the protocol’s
tolerance and the users would not abort the transmission. For simplicity, let us divide
them into three scenarios:
1⃝ Eve does not interact with Alice’s pulses. Therefore Alice and Bob see a QBER
that does not include any interference from Eve and is below 11%.
2⃝ Eve interacts with every pulse Alice sends, thus causing a QBER that is greater
than 11%. If PIM = 25%, then the QBER would be 12.5%, as discussed.
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3⃝ An average of the previous scenarios, so the overall QBER is an average as well,
and smaller than 11%.
These scenarios are illustrated in the top section of Fig. 4.7. Although the QBER
is below 11% in scenario 3⃝, this case is still secure due to the fact that the key
rate is a convex function of the QBER (see e.g. [10, 187]) and, conversely, Eve’s
information is a concave function of the QBER, as shown in the bottom section of
Fig. 4.7. Suppose that C1 and C2 (Q1 and Q2) are the count rates (QBERs) pertaining
to undisturbed and blinding pulses, respectively. Then the average QBER seen by the
users is Q3 =
C1Q1+C2Q2
C1+C2
. The convexity of the key rate and the fact that R(Q2) = 0
imply that
R(Q3)≤ R(Q1)+R(Q2) = R(Q1), (4.3)
where R(Q1) and R(Q2) are the key rates from separate undisturbed and blinding
pulses, respectively. Eq. (4.3) shows that there is at least a fraction R(Q1) of secure
bits in the users’ signals. This comes from the fact that R(Q1) is associated with the
undisturbed pulses. In the real case, the users measure Q3 and distill a secure fraction
R(Q3), rather than measuring Q1 and Q2 separately. This, by virtue of Eq. (4.3), is a
pessimistic estimate of the fraction of secure bits in the sample, hence the protocol is
secure. Looking at Fig. 4.7 again, this is because Eve’s information is actually given
by Im, but since Alice and Bob don’t examine scenarios 1⃝ and 2⃝ separately, they
calculate Eve’s information to be I3, thereby overestimating it and carrying out more
privacy amplification than required. This guarantees that Eve’s information is always
zero.
4.8 Intensity modulation for ‘free’
We note that some QKD systems may already contain the architecture for introducing
this modulation without the need of additional components. We consider a receiver
configuration used in the T12 protocol, a type of phase-encoded QKD protocol [19]
in Fig. 4.8. In this protocol, Alice uses an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer
(MZI) to encode her qubits on her weak coherent pulses and an intensity modulator
for performing the decoy state method. Bob then uses a matching MZI for decoding
the pulses, with a polarisation controller (PC) beforehand to ensure the light is split
equally at the PBS such that interference occurs at the final beamsplitter (BS).
In this set-up, Eve instead aims to send all of her blinding power down one arm of
the MZI such that no interference occurs at the final beamsplitter and the optical power
is split equally between the two detectors, thus blinding them. However, as the first
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Fig. 4.7 Eve’s information Illustrated explanation of the relationship between Eve’s
information and the QBER. The top section of the figure indicates the QBER in three
scenarios, where Eve doesn’t mount her attack, always mounts it and the average of
the two, respectively. For each QBER, Eve’s information and the subsequent secure
key rate can be determined by the users. The bottom figure shows her information as a
function of the QBER. It demonstrates that if Alice and Bob only pay attention to the
overall average QBER and infer Eve’s information from this, they in fact overestimate
her knowledge, which is more accurately given by an average of Eve’s information
extracted from the two separate QBERs, Q1 and Q2.
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polarizing beamsplitter (PBS) has a finite extinction ratio, some light will always leak
down the other arm. When Bob applies his phase modulation to choose his basis, he is
introducing a phase difference between the two arms and in the scenario where Eve
sends bright CW light into the MZI this has an analogous effect to using an intensity
modulator.
To investigate this, we place the MZI depicted in Fig. 4.8 between the IM and
APD shown in Fig. 4.2. In this instance, we initially operate the IM differently, for the
purpose of pulse carving our CW to simulate a pulsed laser. This was done to so that
calibration and demonstration of our countermeasure to blinding could be performed
without disturbing the set-up and the same laser could be used for both steps. Initially,
the output of the IM was connected to a power meter. A 1/64 modulation was used for
calibration and the optical power as a function of the IM DC was minimised so that the
background was kept as low as possible. After this step, the IM was then connected to
the PC which was in turn connected to the MZI, one of whose outputs was connected
to a fast photodiode plugged into the oscilloscope.
Fig. 4.8 Bob’s receiver Configuration of Bob’s decoding apparatus used in the T12
protocol. PC: polarisation controller; PBS: polarising beamsplitter; PM: phase
modulator; BS: beamsplitter; SD-APD: self-differencing avalanche photodiode.
The polarisation is calibrated using the PC such that the majority of the optical
power goes down one arm, as shown in Fig. 4.9 by the blue curve where only one pulse
is visible and its height has been maximised. The red curve shows an uncalibrated
situation for comparison, where two pulses are visible. This situation is then verified
by varying the DC to the phase modulator (PM) in the MZI and monitoring the pulses.
If the majority of light is travelling down one arm, then adjusting the relative phase
between the two arms of the MZI would make no difference as no visible interference
is occurring at the BS. Therefore, if changing the DC to the PM has no effect, this
confirms the input light has been properly calibrated.
We therefore measure the count rates of one of the detectors when modulation
is applied with a 1/16 modulation rate, as is typical for the T12 protocol, shown in
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Fig. 4.9 Mach-Zehnder interferometer calibration Oscilloscope traces taken at one
of the output ports where the polarisation at the polarisation controller in Fig. 4.8 is
adjusted to control how the light propagates through the interferometer. The top case
denotes the majority travelling down one arm, the desirable case for Eve, whereas the
bottom part shows a non-calibrated set-up.
Fig. 4.10 (a). We find that this causes a similar recovery to that observed with the
IM and this is confirmed by examination of the resultant waveform, see Fig. 4.10 (b),
suggesting that, in fact, the power is not all travelling down one arm due to the
aforementioned imperfect extinction ratio of the PBS. We note, however, that this is
limited to the case where Eve uses a CW laser. By using a pulsed laser, Eve can avoid
interference at the final BS and thus bypass this countermeasure.
4.9 Summary and Discussion
In conclusion, we have devised and experimentally demonstrated a new technique to
mitigate detector blinding. By using an intensity modulator and an SD circuit, we
modulated the incoming light to create uneven avalanches for the case of strong input
light. Significantly, whilst this protects the detector from Eve it only introduces a small
intrinsic attenuation of Alice’s signal. We showed that a modulation depth of 0.06 dB
is sufficient to prevent an SD detector from being blinded. In our experimental test,
we adopted a continuous-wave laser. A pulsed laser would be no more effective at
blinding an SD detector as it creates more intensity fluctuations, to which the detector
is very sensitive. Although intensity modulation to prevent Eve’s faked-state attack has
been previously addressed in the literature [142], this was concerned with controlling
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Fig. 4.10 Inherent countermeasure against CW blinding (a) APD count rates as a
function of optical power in the presence and absence of the MZI. (b) an example APD
waveform taken using with the MZI in use and with an optical power that would cause
the APD to be blind otherwise.
an already blinded detector. Our approach, on the contrary, includes a SD circuit to
prevent blinding in the first place and thus eliminate the possibility of a faked-state
attack at the root.
The proposed IM measure entails a considerable extrinsic loss penalty of around
2.5–5 dB, arising from imperfect intensity modulators based on LiNbO3 and will
therefore negatively impact the secure key rate. The loss associated with the product of
the modulation rate of 1/4 and extinction ratio of 0.06 dB is comparatively negligible,
hence the key rate in the presence of modulation would be 0.315 times the unmodulated
key rate and the distance would be shortened by 25 km, assuming a maximum insertion
loss of 5 dB. Although QKD systems typically have two or more detectors, placing an
intensity modulator in front of only one would be sufficient to demonstrate the presence
of Eve. We note that existing modulators were designed to achieve high modulation
depth which requires a lengthy crystal waveguide for electro-optical interaction. With a
reduced modulation depth, the insertion loss can be made significantly smaller, thereby
alleviating the loss penalty. Although intensity modulators are typically polarization
sensitive, Eve cannot mount an attack such that she simply sends light of a polarization
which does not experience modulation. This is because the detectors in a QKD
system always see a fixed polarization, whether in phase-encoded schemes such as
[188], which contain an electronic polarization controller followed by a polarizing
beamsplitter (PBS) or in polarisation-encoded schemes, such as in [134], which also
have PBSs before the detectors. The use of an IM also requires a random number
generator (RNG). Since Bob typically already has an RNG for the purpose of active
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basis selection, he can use the same RNG operated at twice the clock rate for the IM,
which would not open additional side-channels.
Although the two techniques of mitigating the blinding attack have been shown,
namely with best-practice operation and the use of an IM, the faked state attack in
general can still pose a threat. Eve can choose not to use a blinding attack and instead
carefully adjust the arrival time of her trigger pulse in order to control Bob’s detectors,





The previous two chapters have focused on attempts to mount the faked-state attack
by first blinding the APD so it is insensitive to single photons. However, a more
dangerous attack exists in the form of the faint-after gate attack, where the avalanche
photodiode (APD) maintains its single-photon sensitivity, as no blinding laser is used
and it is therefore more difficult to provide a countermeasure or detect Eve’s presence.
This chapter will explore the noise exhibited as delayed detection events found in
fast-gated detectors that could be used as a measure against the faint-after gate attack.
5.2 The material interface
Gated APDs have been shown to exhibit a short exponential decay in detection events
occurring in the gates following the illuminated gate when biased at high gating
frequencies (i.e. on the order of GHz) [68, 128, 189–192].
The explanation of this phenomenon is incompatible with afterpulses which are
additional avalanches occurring after, and correlated with, photon detection. These
afterpulses take place as a result of deep traps in the multiplication region and have
decays on the order of several nanoseconds or greater [1, 104, 105]. The observed
short decay is, however, consistent with carriers being delayed and later released
through thermionic emission at the potential barrier arising out of the material interface
occurring in InGaAs/InP devices manufactured according to the separate absorption
and multiplication structure [81, 91]. Recapping from chapter 2, in such a structure,
outlined in Fig 5.1, incoming photons are absorbed in the InGaAs region where





























Fig. 5.1 APD structure Typical band diagram of separate absorption, charge and
multiplication structure of an InGaAs/InP APD, where Eg is the band gap offset and
EA is the effective barrier height.
field in this region. Due to its higher ionisation coefficient in InP [89, 90], the
hole is then swept towards the InP multiplication region. In order to reach the InP
multiplication region, the hole needs to overcome the potential barrier that arises from
the aforementioned valence-band mismatch [193]. The ability of the hole to surpass
this is directly related to device characteristics such as detection efficiency and timing
response [194]. Due to this relationship, it is reasonable to conclude that the hole
traverse time is significantly shorter than 1 ns because sub-nanosecond gated-APDs
still show detection efficiencies as high as 55% [68]. If the decay time were longer
than 1 ns, then fewer than half of the generated carriers would overcome the barrier and
the detection efficiency would not be able to exceed 50%. On overcoming the barrier,
the hole arrives at the multiplication region where it undergoes impact ionisation and
generates many more carriers, known as an avalanche, and some of these carriers are
then trapped in deep levels in this region [104, 127]. A macroscopically detectable
current is then created from this carrier multiplication or avalanche, allowing it to be
electronically registered.
In order to mitigate the effect of the potential barrier and allow carriers to more
easily traverse it, the concept of a grading layer was introduced [92]. This involves
the placement of a small InGaAsP layer between the InGaAs absorption and InP
charge layers. As the name suggests, this ‘grades’ the discontinuity that arises from
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the valence band mismatches of the two materials and facilitates the transport of the
carriers within the device. The smoother the transition, the faster the response times of
the device and likely the smaller the effect of noise as a result of carrier trapping at the
interface, although a relationship between the two has not been explicitly explored in
the literature.
Until recently, delayed detection events as a result of this potential barrier have
been considered explicitly only in terms of a drawback. However, it can act as a
positive as it could be used to mitigate a type of attack available to Eve, the faint-after
gate attack, explored in the following section.
5.3 After-gate attack
In many demonstrations of the faked-state attack, Eve first blinds the detector so that it
is insensitive to single photons before mounting her attack. Performing it in this way
makes it more likely that she will leave a strong signature of her presence. As such, it
is desirable for her to remove the need for this step and employ the after-gate attack,
first proposed and demonstrated in [186]. The authors focused on the Clavis2 system
from IDQuantique and were able to mount attacks that introduced a QBER below 11%.
Whilst this satisfies the condition of Alice and Bob not aborting their exchange, she
still introduces fingerprints of her presence, for example in a raised afterpulse rate or
the introduction of clicks in Bob’s detectors that would not occur due to the dead-time
of the system. Furthermore, since reasonably bright pulses were used, a non-avalanche
based watchdog detector at Bob could be used to detect Eve. In order to make things
clear and distinguish this from the faint after-gate attack, this will be referred to as
the bright after-gate attack (although we later show in section 5.5.1 these are likely
extensions of one another).
Later, the same group proposed a similar technique to strengthen Eve’s strategy,
known as the faint after-gate attack (so-called to distinguish it from the bright after-gate
attack in [186]). As before, Eve measures the photons sent by the transmitter, Alice,
with a copy of Bob’s apparatus. She then sends her own pulses to Bob which are only
detected if he chooses the same measurement basis as Eve, else he registers nothing.
In this way, after Alice and Bob exchange basis information, Eve has a string that
is perfectly correlated with that held by Alice and Bob. The aim for Eve is thus to
send a pulse which at full power registers a click with detection probability of 1 and at
half power (corresponding to incompatible bases), registers a click with probability 0.
More generally, when the probability at full power exceeds twice that of half power
in this manner, the relationship is said to be ‘superlinear’. If Eve sends strong pulses
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towards the end of Bob’s APD gate, she can maximise and minimise these probabilities
such that she learns most of the key and also generates a sufficiently low QBER to go
undetected. The original demonstration [137] involved sending pulses of moderately
high flux (∼ 40 photons/pulse) at the end of the APD gate.
By obtaining the detection probability at full power and half power, it is possible
to derive the resultant QBER using the following equation from [137]:
QBER =
2ph − p2h
2p f +2(2ph − p2h)
, (5.1)
where p f is the detection probability at full power and ph is the detection probability
at half power. Note that this equation neglects any errors arising due to dark counts or
afterpulsing and thus only focuses on the detection probability at the target gate. If the
QBER drops below approximately 21%, this indicates superlinearity as p f > 2ph.
The original demonstration of the faint after-gate attack did not produce a QBER
below 11% with any of the fluxes used, although superlinearity was observed. The
authors attributed this partly due to the large temporal width of the laser used in their
study. More recently, the attack was demonstrated on a number of different detectors
with a range of gating frequencies up to 1 GHz, with QBERs as low as 0.31% [195],
although a convincing countermeasure was not presented, highlighting that this is still
an open problem for QKD systems.
We therefore sought to investigate delayed detection events with the aim of answer-
ing two longstanding QKD questions. Firstly, what is the origin of the short decay in
fast-gated APDs and can it be characterised? Secondly, can this short decay be used as
a measure against the faint after-gate attack?
5.4 Characterisation of the fast decay
To examine the short decay in fast-gated detectors, we use a setup similar to that
outlined in [95]. We initially approached the characterisation of the interface in a
similar fashion to [196]. By measuring the single-photon detection efficiency as a
function of the inverse of the temperature and plotting in an Arrhenius configuration,
the barrier height could be extracted as the gradient is equal to εb/kBT [193]. Here,
we optically excite an APD at the start of a gate, as shown in Fig. 5.2. When a hole
fails to overcome the potential barrier within Gate 1, it will have a finite probability to
overcome the barrier and initiate a macroscopic avalanche in subsequent gates within
several nanoseconds.
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Δt
Gate 1 Gate 2
Fig. 5.2 Illustration of APD gating scheme Charges are generated at the start of
Gate 1, where the laser is timed to arrive, and experience an exponential decay between
the two gates. The proportion of charges leftover at Gate 2 is related to the decay
constant which is in turn related to the activation energy given by the barrier height,
EA
In order to probe the after-gate attack with conditions that are most favourable
to Eve, we employed a passively modelocked laser with a repetition frequency of 20
MHz and temporal pulse width of 3 ps. Due to the passive nature of the laser, this
required significant adjustment of the electronics to ensure the APD gates and laser
pulses were synchronised. An outline of the setup used to provide a synchronised 1

















Fig. 5.3 Laser and APD synchronisation scheme An outline of the set-up required
to synchronise the passively modelocked laser with the APD gating apparatus. A
jitter-cleaning evaluation board was needed to multiply the 20 MHz signal to 1 GHz
for driving the APD
Avalanches were discriminated using the self-differencer board comparator and an
appropriate discrimination level was chosen according to the procedure from Chapter 3
and [184, 197]. The avalanches were then counted with an electronic time-tagger
whose results were analysed using a LabView programme.
When extracting the APD characteristics of detection efficiency, dark count rate
and afterpulsing, a 50 ns long histogram is obtained under dark conditions and when
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the APD is illuminated with a flux of µ = 0.1 photons per pulse. The detection









where µ is the photon flux per pulse, Pd is the dark count probability (the count rate
under dark conditions divided by the gating frequency of 1 GHz), R is the count rate
in the illuminated bin of the histogram and fl is the repetition frequency of the laser,
in this case 20 MHz.
The choice of biasing conditions requires careful consideration as the breakdown
voltage is dependent on the APD temperature. We measure this and find that the
breakdown voltage increases at a rate of roughly 0.1V/◦C, as shown in Fig. 5.4, which
is consistent with the literature [39]. Therefore, although good experimental practice
might suggest that the conditions be kept constant, this would produce an opposite
trend to that expected, since the excess bias would simply decrease with increasing
temperature as the breakdown voltage increases (as shown in [119] for example). The
aim is therefore to keep the conditions within the device as consistent as possible.
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Fig. 5.4 Breakdown voltage temperature dependence A linear fit of the measured
points yields a relationship of approximately 0.1V/◦C.
The device is characterised to have a single photon detection efficiency of 28% and
an afterpulsing probability of 4% at room temperature. Here, the optical flux is kept
at 0.1 photon/pulse and its delay is adjusted by shifting the APD gates on the pulse
generator to maximise the efficiency. A maximum efficiency corresponds to the photon
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arrival at the beginning of a gate (Fig. 5.2), which allows an avalanche sufficient
time to grow so as to surpass the discrimination level. A proportion of carriers remain
trapped at the material interface due to the presence of the interface potential barrier
and are subsequently released in the following gate.
Figure 5.5 (a) shows a typical photon detection histogram under such illumination
conditions. The illuminated gate gives a pronounced peak arising from single photon
detections. Immediately after this peak, the count rate experiences a fast decay before
reaching an approximately flat background at the fifth gate. The flat background is
attributed to detector dark and afterpulsing counts. The elevated count rates at Gates
2-4 cannot be attributed to detector afterpulsing because the time-tagger has a dead
time of 50 ns. Moreover, the sub-nanosecond decay time is orders of magnitude faster
than typical lifetimes of deep traps that are responsible for afterpulsing. We attribute
the elevated count rates at these gates to delayed photon detection caused by hole
trapping at the absorption/multiplication interface.
The time-decay was automatically calculated by first subtracting the background
that arises from ‘conventional’ afterpulsing. As these are thought to arise from deep
traps in the multiplication region and have longer decay constants, taking the average
of the count rates in the gates preceding the illuminated gate gives a good indication
of the afterpulse count rate. After subtraction, only delayed detections arising from
the material interface should be left, allowing for an accurate calculation of the
corresponding decay constant. The decay constant is then taken using the natural
logarithm of the ratio between the count rates in Gates 1 and 3 (Gate 2 is ignored to
ensure the self-differencer does not affect the result).
By examining the second bin of the histogram in Fig. 5.5 (a) (which corresponds
to Gate 2 in Fig. 5.2), we already have a clear indication of the interface playing a
role. If afterpulsing were the sole source of trapping resulting in delayed detection in
this bin, due to self-differencing cancellation, this bin would be heavily suppressed.
The imposed deadtime of 50 ns also has the same effect, meaning clicks registered in
bin 2 are uncorrelated with those occurring in bin 1, so they cannot occur as a result of
afterpulses. The observed short decay of 289 ps in the histogram must therefore arise
from a separate source of trapping, namely the material interface.
Plotting the lifetimes extracted from Fig. 5.5 (a) at different temperatures in an
Arrhenius configuration allows for the extraction of the effective barrier height at the
material interface [193], shown in Fig. 5.5 (b), where the gradient is equal to εb/kBT .
We note that the values of activation energies and the trend of higher excess biases
resulting in overall shorter lifetimes, and consequently lower activation energies, are
consistent with the literature [193, 196]. This implies that carriers with shorter decays
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of several hundred picoseconds are dominated by trapping at the heterointerface when
the APD is illuminated with fluxes of the order of single photons.
Whilst the technique used to obtain Fig. 5.5(b) contains similarities to those used
in [196], they are not identical. Ideally, the values of activation energies would be
checked using those techniques, but we were unable to cool the APDs to the required
temperature. Therefore, although the values and trends appear to bear agreement
to the literature, we are hesitant to definitely conclude the activation energy at the
interface has been measured. Indeed, it is likely that traps of varying depth exist in
the multiplication region, and these could also display similar results. Although this
suggests that further study is needed, the presence of the delayed detections themselves
is beyond doubt and they can still be utilised to mitigate the faint after-gate attack, as
we discuss in the following section.
5.5 Mitigating the after-gate attack
Carriers with the short decays of approximately 300-400 ps that have been charac-
terised could then be used to mitigate the faint after-gate attack. This is because Eve’s
attempt to mount such an attack using moderately high fluxes would result in delayed
detection events that would alert the users to her presence. The sub-nanosecond
separation between gates in GHz-clocked APDs is sufficiently narrow to allow de-
layed detection as a result of carriers with a decay on the order of several hundred
picoseconds to be observed where they would be missed in slower, MHz-clocked
systems [137, 195]. This hypothesis is illustrated in Fig. 5.6 and indeed we find that
delayed detection can effectively reveal Eve’s presence. However, we find that in this
regime, traps at the multiplication region become the dominant contribution to delayed
detection events, which we now examine.
We note that the measurement of overall detection probability needed for equa-
tion 5.1, rather than simply the APD count rate, is not straightforward. In general,
it can be extracted simply by dividing the detector count rate by the laser repetition
frequency. However, when we performed this using the same oscilloscope photon
counting technique outlined in section 3.4, detection probabilities greater than unity
were obtained. This is due to a ripple effect arising at large incident fluxes which
means individual avalanches are counted more than once (also shown in Fig. 4.4 (b)).
Therefore, two further methods for determining the detection probability were
developed. The first of these employed the oscilloscope in histogram mode. A
histogram window of width equal to the inverse of the sampling rate of the oscilloscope
(62.5 ps corresponding to a 16 GBit/s sampling rate) was placed over the section of
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Fig. 5.5 Characterising the material interface (a) Time-resolved histogram of de-
tected counts of the APD under illumination of a pulsed laser with flux µ = 0.1, clearly
demonstrating an exponential decay in counts after the initial illuminated gate; (b) An
Arrhenius plot showing the lifetime extracted from the histogram as a function of the
inverse of the temperature, whereby the gradients allow for the extraction of the hole
activation energy for each respective APD excess bias.
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Fig. 5.6 Delayed detection mitigating the after-gate attack Schematic demonstrat-
ing that when Eve mounts her after-gate attack by sending moderately strong pulses at
the end of Bob’s APD gate (compared to Alice sending single photons at the start of
the gate), she has a high probability of inducing delayed detection in the subsequent
gate and revealing herself.
the APD waveform corresponding to the illuminated target gate. We analysed the
histogram statistics and determined the proportion of hits that occurred above the
discrimination level, thus giving a figure of the detection probability. This ensured
only the target gate was measured and additional ripples were ignored, therefore the
maximum achievable detection probability was unity. Unfortunately, limitations of
the equipment mean this technique is inefficient at gathering a large statistical sample,
therefore such a measurement needs to be run for an extended period to even out
statistical fluctuations.
The second technique involved using a time-tagger with a configurable deadtime to
analyse APD clicks. The deadtime eliminates the ripples and the resulting histogram
was used to measure the detection probability in individual gates. This was suitable for
regimes outside of the APD gate, where the detection probability is low, therefore the
count rates are sufficiently low to avoid saturating the time-tagger. However inside the
gate the count rates become too high for the instrument to register (the same problem
reported in section 3.4). When used, a deadtime of 50 ns, corresponding to the laser
period, was chosen.
We measured the detection probability at full (80 photons/pulse) and half (40
photons/pulse) power of an optical trigger pulse as a function of the arrival time of
the laser pulse on the APD. We do this by varying the delay on the pulse generator
providing the AC signal to the APD. Using these values as p f and ph respectively
in Eq. 5.1 allows us to calculate the QBER resulting from Eve when considering the
target gate and neglecting afterpulses and dark counts. The result is given for the APD
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Fig. 5.7 QBER introduced by the after-gate attack (a) QBER as a function of
temporal separation from the maximum single photon efficiency delay value. The black
line indicates the case where delayed detection is ignored and the QBER is calculated
with Eq. 5.1 and Eve appears not to introduce a QBER greater than 11% and thereby
remains undetected. When delayed detection is taken into account, as shown in the
blue line calculated with Eq. 5.3, the QBER rises above 11% and she can be detected.;
(b) Histograms taken at minimum QBER values showing detection probabilities in
each time bin at 20◦C. Under half-power illumination of µ = 40 (in orange), bin 2 is
always larger than bin 1, which would result in a QBER value of 50% in that bin.; (c)
as (a) but measured with the APD at –30◦C.; (d) as (b) but measured with the APD at
–30◦C.
At a certain temporal separation from maximum detection, the QBER drops below
11% (illustrated as the red dashed line), reaching a minimum of approximately 7 % at
around 153 ps at room temperature, suggesting Eve could mount such an attack at this
delay and remain undetected. Either side of this trough, the QBER equals 25 % since
either p f = ph = 1 around the centre of the gate or p f = ph ≈ 0 outside of the gate.
To probe the effect of delayed detection, we examine the histograms in the vicinity
of the superlinear regime, i.e. corresponding to the conditions of an after-gate attack,
for two different temperatures, as shown in Fig. 5.7 (b) and (d). We note that for the
cases where Eve is using the after-gate attack, a higher proportion of clicks actually
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occur in the gate adjacent to the target gate (Gate 2 as opposed to Gate 1) when
she chooses an incompatible basis to Bob, shown as the orange bars. Each delayed
detection event has an equal probability of producing a correct or incorrect bit as they
are uncorrelated with Alice’s qubit preparation.
This underlines the importance of incorporating delayed detection events into the
calculation of the QBER. To this end, we estimate the delayed detection probabilities
under full and half power pulses and add them to the detection probability without















The quantity Q′ in Eq. (5.3) represents the QBER measured in the presence of the
after-gate attack when delayed detection is taken into account. This is accounted for
with the term pdd , which represents the average probability per gate of a 1-gate-delayed
detection. The factor 1/4 (1/2) in the expression is due to having a click in Bob’s
detectors when his basis matches (does not match) Eve’s basis in the previous gate.
In Eq. (5.5), pdd| f (pdd|h) is the probability of a delayed detection in gate n when a
full-power (half-power) pulse impinged on the detector at gate n−1, represented as a
violet-coloured (salmon-coloured) bar in Fig. 5.7 (b) (Fig. 5.7 (d)).
We further underline that this treatment approaches the QBER by incorporating
all delayed detections, of which afterpulsing is a specific case, making this analysis
more general. Earlier analyses have been solely concerned with afterpulsing, which is
a delayed detection probability conditional on a legitimate click. This has resulted in
the QBER previously being defined as follows (see section 1.5 and [198, 199])
Q = Qopt +
1
2
Pa +Qd +Qb, (5.6)
where Qopt is the error which arises from imperfection in encoding apparatus, for
example due to finite interferometer visibility or misalignment, Pa is the APD afterpulse
probability, Qd is the error arising from detector dark counts and Qb accounts both
for noise contributions from pulse broadening caused by fiber dispersion that could
result in inter-symbol interference and Raman noise when quantum signals coexist
with classical ones. As discussed earlier, the salmon coloured bars in the histograms of
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Figs. 5.7 (b) and (d) at Gate 2 are greater than those in Gate 1. This would correspond to
an afterpulsing probability, Pa, greater than 100%, therefore according to equation 5.6
the QBER would be 50%, confirming our original intuition.
We plot the resulting QBER from Eq. (5.3) with blue lines in Figs. 5.7 (a) and
5.7 (c). As is apparent from the figures, the 11% security threshold, typical of the BB84
protocol, is now overcome. This result highlights the effectiveness of the delayed
detection at mitigating the faint after-gate attack.
By including contributions from delayed detection in Eq. 5.3, we assume Eve
mounts her attack all the time. We therefore address the case whereby Eve only attacks
a fraction of gates. In this case, the overall QBER would be smaller than the 11%
tolerance and thus Alice and Bob would not abort their key exchange. However, Eve’s
information would also be smaller. Consequently, due to the key rate having a convex
dependence on the QBER [10, 187], this case is still secure, as Alice and Bob’s privacy
amplification always overestimates Eve’s knowledge of the key [34] (see section 4.7).
Furthermore, this rationale overestimates Eve’s chances to gain information because it
assumes that the QBER is zero for the cases where Eve does not attack, whereas in the
real case it clearly is larger than zero due to the delayed detection effect.
We also consider the case where Eve attempts to carry out a hybrid attack scheme,
whereby she attempts to blind counts in Gate 2 and thus suppress any erroneous counts
as a result of her after-gate attack on Gate 1. Whilst it has been shown that blinding
attacks are ineffective against appropriately operated self-differencing APDs [184],
this places the onus on the user and such devices are often improperly used. However,
for Eve to blind Gate 2, due to the cancellation nature of the self-differencing circuit,
she would also have to shine strong light on Gate 1, thereby negating her original
attack.
5.5.1 Understanding the after-gate attack
For the demonstration of the attack presented in above in Fig. 5.7, we chose µ f = 80
and µh = 40 as the full and half power fluxes respectively as these were values used
in the original proposal in [137]. By expanding our measurement to examine a range
of fluxes at room temperature, we were able to obtain a more general picture of the
parameters that Eve could use (assuming delayed detections were neglected) but also
to observe an overall trend, as shown in the measurement performed using a fast
oscilloscope in Fig. 5.8.
The dark purple regions within the dotted line indicate a flux and delay combination
which produces a QBER that is lower than 11 % when calculated using Eq. 5.1, within
which Eve will choose to operate. The pale yellow parts in the top right of the
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figure indicate a QBER of 25 % which occurs when p f = ph = 1. The dark speckles
in the bottom section to the right of the purple band are where the count rates are
comparatively low, meaning detection probabilities of zero are often measured. This
overall trend of this figure implies that the closer to the centre of the gate Eve moves,
the smaller the flux she should use to mount her attack. This suggests that this is
an extension of the original proposed after-gate attack [137], whereby the APD is
operating in linear mode and strong pulses of power Pth overcome the discrimination
level and causes the detector to click, whereas pulses of power Pth/2 often do not and
therefore rarely cause a click.




















Fig. 5.8 Eve’s possible parameters A contour plot of the QBER as a function of the
flux of the trigger pulse and APD gate delay with respect to the laser. The region inside
the dotted line indicates where the QBER is lower than 11 % and thus Eve can mount
a successful attack in this parameter space if delayed detections are neglected.
5.5.2 Delayed detection events for mitigating the after-gate attack
As mentioned earlier, the origin of delayed detection when the APD is subjected to the
after-gate attack is predominantly due to carrier trapping in the multiplication region.
At room temperature, the lifetimes extracted from Fig. 5.7 (b) are comparable to the
case shown in Fig. 5.5 (b). However, at –30◦C, the lifetimes become much longer
than those shown in Fig. 5.5 (b) for the same temperature, by approximately 2-3 times.
This suggests the existence of deeper traps and that these traps, rather than the material



























Fig. 5.9 Origin of delayed detection Detection probability in Gate 2 as a function of
temporal separation from maximum single photon detection efficiency for APD 2. The
peak in the left-hand side of the figure can be explained by the dominance of trapping
in the multiplication region.
interface, are responsible for the delayed detection in the after-gate attack. We believe
these deeper traps are located in the multiplication region.
This is supported by measuring the detection probability in the adjacent gate (Gate
2 in Fig. 5.2) as a function of separation from the maximum detection for APD 2,
as shown in Fig. 5.9. Reading left to right, the laser is moving away from the end
of Gate 1 and approaching the start of Gate 2. The detection probability initially
decreases as the laser approaches Gate 2. Here, impact ionisation is occurring and
therefore carriers are multiplied and a portion of these multiplied carriers are trapped
in the multiplication region, shown in purple. The high detection probability on the
left-hand side roughly coincides with the QBER dip, underlining that delayed detection
largely arises from trapping in the multiplication layer. If the interface were the major
contributor, the detection would continue to increase the closer to Gate 2 the laser is
as the carriers have a progressively shorter time to decay before Gate 2 is activated.
However, at a certain point the probability flattens and then begins to increase, an
observation which is consistent with interface trapping, suggesting it starts to take over
once carriers cease to become trapped in deep levels at the multiplication region.
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5.6 Best practice for choosing an APD gating frequency
Using the discovery of delayed detection allows us to define the best practice for
choosing a suitable gating frequency for QKD. For our analysis at two individual
temperatures, 20◦C and –50◦C, we only consider trapping at the material interface.
This is the more conservative definition from a security point of view, as it requires
higher gating frequencies to maintain the delayed detection required for preserving the
protection against the after-gate attack. This range of gating frequencies fulfils two
criteria; (i) the gating frequency is low enough to separate adjacent gates temporally
such that a click in the first has a small enough probability to have a delayed detection
in the second without raising the QBER above the tolerance threshold of 11% under
operation in the absence of Eve, assuming Alice sends a flux of µ = 0.4 photons per
pulse; (ii) equally, the gating frequency is high enough such that Eve would cause
clicks in the gate adjacent to her target gate with a large enough probability to raise
the QBER above the aforementioned threshold, which we examine for a conservative
attacking flux of µ = 20 photons per pulse that is favourable for hiding Eve’s presence
(see section 5.5.1). Our simulation result is shown in Fig. 5.10, with the narrow white
band indicating a regime where the APD is neither too ‘Noisy’ nor ‘Vulnerable’. Due
to the longer carrier decays at lower temperatures, we note that lower temperatures
are more favourable for slower gating whereas higher temperatures are more suited
to faster gating. Most significantly, gating frequencies of around 1 GHz, which are
commonly used for QKD experiments (e.g. [13, 200, 63]) as well as in this study, fall
in the white region, suggesting these to be optimal values for QKD.
5.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have investigated two sources of trapping of carriers in InGaAs
APDs: at the potential well arising at the interface between the APD absorption and
charge regions, and at deep traps in the multiplication region. In characterising the
carrier lifetime at the heterojunction, we have provided the first explanation for short
decays observed in fast-gated APDs. We have determined that in the after-gate regime,
however, the major contribution to delayed detection events that can provide enhanced
security arise from traps in the multiplication region. We have provided the first
evidence that fast-gated APDs can be used to mitigate the after-gate attack due to
the additional contribution to the QBER that arises from delayed detection events.
By exploiting the intrinsic imperfection of the material interface, we were able to
bound the appropriate APD gating frequency suitable for use in QKD. The faked state
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μ = 20, -50oC
μ = 20, 20oC
No Eve, -50oC
No Eve, 20oC
Fig. 5.10 Useable gating frequencies Quantum bit error rate (QBER) as a function
of gating frequency at 20◦C and –50◦C. The central white region indicates suitable
operation, where the APD is both safe from the after-gate attack (with an attacking
flux of µ = 20 photons per pulse) and has sufficiently low noise to make QKD possible
(with an average flux of µ = 0.4 photons per pulse).
attacks covered in this and the preceding two chapters all present the legitimate users
opportunities for detecting Eve as they require her to actively interact with the QKD
setup. Therefore, it is more favourable for her to act as passively as possible so as to
operate undetected. The following chapter explores an imperfection in APDs which





The previous chapters in this thesis have addressed ways in which Eve actively interacts
with Bob’s apparatus in order to learn the secure key. This presents more of an
opportunity for her presence to be detected than when she behaves passively. Avalanche
photodiodes can emit light under certain conditions, which presents a backdoor that
Eve could exploit to learn secure bits by simply measuring this emitted light, known
as backflashes. In this chapter, we characterised the quantity of backflashed light for
a GHz-gated self-differencing single-photon avalanche photodiode (SD APD) and
related it to the information leakage to Eve. By quantifying the effect of backflashes
on the secure key rate, we have determined that the security implications of this
phenomenon are negligible.
6.2 Light emission from avalanche photodiodes
The phenomenon of p-n junctions emitting light when reverse biased to breakdown
was first observed for silicon devices in [201]. However, it wasn’t until 2001 when
this concept was first thought of as a security problem for QKD [202]. As this was
still concerned with silicon devices, which are unsuitable for wide-spread fibre optics
QKD implementations, studies on InGaAs APDs are of most interest and will be the
focus of this chapter.
Only the past few years have yielded research into more commonly used InGaAs
APDs for QKD. The most significant study was performed in [203] on 2 types of
detector, one commercial and one developed by the group, both of which were gated
at relatively low frequencies of 50 kHz. The authors defined a metric, known as
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information leakage, for measuring how detrimental the level of backflashes for a





where NB is the number of detected backflashes, NA is the number of detected valid
APD counts (i.e neglecting dark counts), ηdet is the detection efficiency of the monitor-
ing detector, and ηch is the channel loss between the APD under test and the monitoring
detector. The authors found values of information leakage for their detectors to be
9.8% and 6%. This means that for their least vulnerable detector, for approximately
every 16 raw bits that Bob obtains, Eve will obtain 1 bit.
Such a significant proportion suggests this security loophole could be quite dan-
gerous and as such a countermeasure could be necessary, whether that is a software
modification (such as additional privacy amplification) or hardware one (additional
components). A natural idea, as suggested by the authors, would be the placement of
an isolator at Bob, echoing a countermeasure against Trojan horse attacks [34]. Whilst
this would undoubtedly be effective, the introduction of additional components at Bob
is to be avoided due to the extra loss they would incur, thus providing a penalty to
the secure key rate. Therefore it is more desirable to reduce the inherent backflash
phenomenon at the APD. In order to understand how this may be possible, it is useful
to first explore the origin of backflashes.
It has been suggested in the literature that backflashes can arise from two effects.
The first of these is recombination [204]. Once a photon is absorbed in the InGaAs
region, an electron-hole pair is generated. The hole is swept towards the InP multipli-
cation region and there many more carriers are generated through impact ionisation. In
this process a number of holes accumulate in the valence band and the same number of
electrons are present in the conduction band which can then recombine and generate
a photon. As this occurs in the InP region, where the band gap is 1.35 eV at room
temperature [205], the emitted light would peak at a wavelength of around 920 nm.
The second possible origin is a relaxation of the large number of hot carriers that
are generated in the multiplication region [203]. As the carriers that arise from impact
ionisation have a range of energies, light emitted this way would be expected to be
broadband and would include the telecom wavelengths.
Several studies have examined the spectral characteristics of backflashes [203, 206,
207], although they have not been able to conclude which phenomenon contributes to
the origin of backflashes. This is largely due to the use of a second InGaAs APD as a
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monitoring detector. This has meant that backflash detection has been restricted to the
spectrum to which these APDs are sensitive. namely the telecom band at around 1550
nm. Furthermore, all aforementioned the studies have not corrected for the APDs’
spectral dependent efficiency, hence the trends have tended to correlate with the APDs’
quantum efficiency.
One study appears to have analysed a wide spectral range and corrected for the
spectral sensitivity of their system [208]. They observed a large peak at around 900 nm,
correlating with recombination, and then a much fainter broad distribution, suggesting
the hot-carrier relaxation. However, no details of their system are given, making it
difficult to make a conclusive judgement.
In both hypotheses, the rate of backflash emission is related to the number of
carriers generated in the multiplication region. As such, under normal operation, it
would be desirable to limit the charge in the APD as much as possible without severe
detriment to device performance. For gated APDs, this can simply be done by applying
narrow ‘ON’ gates to the device such that the time over which the avalanche grows
is limited [203]. This naturally suggests that faster-gated devices would provide an
inherent reduction in the charge and hence emit fewer backflashes. This is a particularly
attractive solution as the key rate would not be adversely affected through the need
for either further privacy amplification or components with additional loss. Indeed,
operating detectors with higher clock rates would, in fact, improve the secure key rate.
In this study, we study the information leakage of GHz-gated InGaAs APDs and
find it to be an order of magnitude lower than the previous best performance in the
literature. Using this finding, we derive a new bound for the secure key rate that
incorporates backflashes. We also measure the backflash dependence on the APD
current and thereby confirm their origin to be the InP multiplication region.
6.3 Experimental setup
An InGaAs/InP APD is chosen as the device under test. It is thermoelectrically cooled
to –30◦C where the breakdown voltage is 62.16 V. When driven with a constant DC
bias of 59.66 V and a peak-to-peak 1 GHz AC signal of 10 V, the APD exhibits a
detection efficiency of 17%, a dark count probability of 1.9×10−6 and an afterpulse
probability of 5%.
For investigating the information leakage of a GHz-gated APD, a separate moni-
toring detector with sufficiently low dead time (i.e. on the order of nanoseconds) and
high detection efficiency is required to gain an accurate picture of backflashes. The
deadtime of the monitoring detector has proved to be a limiting factor in previous
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studies, meaning investigations have been restricted to using free-running APDs to
monitor slower-gated detectors [203]. By using superconducting nanowire detectors
(SSPDs) which have detection efficiencies exceeding 80% and deadtimes of only
several nanoseconds (as well as emitting no backflashes themselves), it is possible
to conduct the first experiment into backflashes of fast-gated detectors. The APD is
illuminated with a C-band pulsed laser diode with a repetition frequency of 1/64 of the
APD gating frequency (15.625 MHz). The flux is controlled using a variable optical
attenuator. We illuminate the APD with 0.1 photons/pulse, a flux typical for QKD, at
the start of the APD gate. By extracting the counts from the illuminated bin of the
APD detection histogram (see Fig. 5.5(a)), we can obtain a value for use in Eq. 6.1.
The backflashes are then quantified by measuring the count rate of a superconducting
nanowire single-photon detector (SSPD) used as a monitoring detector, NB, multiplied
by its detection efficiency, ηdet , which is 80% and the channel loss, ηch, which is
0.78. The light enters port 1 of a circulator and port 2 is connected to the APD.
Emitted backflashes then re-enter the circular and exit via port 3, after which they are
measured with the SSPD. The detected APD counts and backflashes are interpreted
with a time-tagging single-photon counter. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.1.
Fig. 6.1 Experimental setup Schematic of the experiment used to investigate APD
backflashes, with the dotted line surrounding the WDMs indicating they were only
used in one experiment. The WDMs were either used as band pass or band reject
filters. LD: laser diode; WDM (B.P.): wavelength division multiplexer (band pass);
WDM (B.R.): wavelength division multiplexer (band reject); VOA: variable optical
attenuator; SSPD: superconducting single photon detector; TCSPC: time-correlated
single-photon counter
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6.4 Extracting the backflash rate
In an ideal case, any light detected by the SSPDs can be attributed to backflashes.
However, backreflections from the APD are also detected and can artificially raise the
SSPD count rate. An example of this is shown in the histogram of SSPD detection
events with the APD DC and AC disabled in red in the top graph of Fig. 6.2. The
peak features at approximately 17 and 49 ns can be attributed to backreflections and
they dominate the SSPD detection events when the APD is on, as shown in the blue
bars of the same figure. It is also interesting to note that the blue bars corresponding
to backflashes are reasonably uniformly distributed across the histogram, with the
exception of the second backreflected peak. At this point of approximately 49 ns, the
blue bars have a much larger amplitude (around 100 counts rather than 40) which
suggests that this peak corresponds to reflection from the APD surface itself and
that the backflashes are strongly correlated with APD detection events. This is to be
expected as when the APD is illuminated, there is a high probability of carriers being
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Fig. 6.2 SSPD histogram Top: Histogram of the detection events on the SSPD when
the APD is illuminated with a flux of µ = 0.1photons/pulse. The red bars show the
histogram when the APD is off and only SSPD dark counts and backreflections are
detected. The blue bars are with the APD on and a large DC of 61.66 V applied.
Bottom: Subtracted histogram with backreflections removed, leaving only backflashes
In order to obtain a true measure of the information leakage, it was necessary to
isolate the backreflections. A simple technique for this is simply to neglect them in
post processing. This was done by subtracting the SSPD histogram with the APD
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turned off, so that only backflashes were measured, shown in the bottom graph of
Fig. 6.2. This large peak also at around 49 ns supports the hypothesis given above that
the backflashes are correlated with APD detection events.
A second technique was also used by means of spectrally filtering the backreflected
light. A wavelength division multiplexer (WDM) centred at 1550.12 nm was placed in
the transmission path and used as a band pass filter. 3 additional WDMs were then
used between the circulator and SSPD and as a band-reject filters. This combination
was used to ensure all backreflected light was rejected. The spectra of the unfiltered
laser, the laser with the band-pass WDM and the laser with both WDMs is given in
Fig. 6.3 and shows a rejection of at least approximately 20 dB between the highest
points of the filtered and raw signals respectively. We expect the rejection to be better
than this as we are filtering for photons reflected from the APD surface rather than
directly transmitted and this should therefore easily remove any contributions from
backreflections.
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Fig. 6.3 Wavelengh division multiplexer (WDM) characterisation Laser spectrum
measured with an optical spectral analyser (OSA) separately, with a band-pass WDM
and band-pass followed by 3 band-reject WDMs.
6.5 Information leakage
The SSPD count rate was measured simultaneously alongside the APD detection effi-
ciency using the two aformentioned techniques as well as the uncorrected histograms
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to provide an absolute upper bound on Eve’s information. The information leakage
was then extracted in each case using Eq. 6.1 and is plotted in Fig. 6.4. The previous
state-of-the-art from [203] was also plotted with a purple star as a comparison.
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Fig. 6.4 Information leakage plotted as a function of the APD single-photon detection
efficiency with the three aforementioned measurement techniques. The black squares
show the information leakage calculated using the raw SSPD count rate, the red circles
with the subtraction of the histogram with the APD turned off and the blue triangles
using the wavelength division multiplexers (WDMs). The purple star indicates the
corresponding information leakage for a commercially available APD, IDQ 201. The
fact that the data taken with the WDM does not overlap with that taken without
supports the hypothesis that backflashes are also filtered out by the WDMs. Indeed, the
increasing discrepancy arises from the SSPD count rate in the presence of the WDMs
remaining approximately constant at the dark count level.
We see where no WDM is used and the backreflected counts are subtracted after-
wards, the data appears initially very noisy at low efficiency. This is due to the SSPD
count rate being similar to its dark count rate, which suggests the rate of backflashes is
very low. The data then appears much smoother from an efficiency of 10% as the rate
of backflashes increases. As the information leakage remains more or less constant
from then on, this suggests the relationship between backflashes and APD counts is
linear. By comparing this to the IDQ 201 detector at the same detection efficiency of
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20%, we see an order of magnitude improvement in the information leakage, which
supports the hypothesis that shorter gates will emit fewer backflashes.
For the case in the presence of the WDM, the information leakage is lowest. This
is due to the fact that the SSPD count rate is very low, comparable to its dark count
rate, suggesting the WDM is also filtering a large proportion of backflashes. This is
reinforced by the relative noisiness of the data arising from the spontaneous nature of
dark counts. Furthermore, the information leakage decreases with increasing efficiency,
because the SSPD count rate is remaining around its dark count level whilst the APD
counts are increasing. This explains why the red and blue points do not overlap, as
they would be expected to if only backreflections were neglected.
Using the value for information leakage, which is a direct measurement of Eve’s
information, we can derive a new secure key rate in the presence of backflashes. This
has been partially investigated in [138] where the authors approach the derivation of the
key rate from a photon number splitting perspective and treat the information leakage
as ‘tagged’ bits, but originating from Bob rather than Alice [209, 210]. However, the
authors in [138] assume the backflash probability, and therefore information leakage,
remains constant over all distances, which means they obtain a very pessimistic
estimate for the secure key rate. In reality, as the information leakage is dependent on
an APD click, the APD click probability should also be incorporated into this analysis
so that the key rate is affected by the same proportion, regardless of distance. We use
a modified version of the key rate for single-photon BB84 given in [138] and from






where q is the basis choice probability, Pclick is the probability of a click on a detector,
PL is the information leakage (defined in Eq. 6.1), h(x) is the binary Shannon entropy
and f is the error correction efficiency. For more detailed definitions, I refer the reader
to section 1.5. It is interesting to note that by simply multiplying the information
leakage term by the click probability in the key rate definition from [138], thereby
including a dependence of the backflash probability on the APD detection probability,
that equation reduces to Eq. 6.2.
Using detector characteristics from this study we plot the key rate as a function
of distance for several values of information leakage, namely zero (the solid black
line), 6×10−2 (blue points), which was the previous state-of-the-art and 5×10−3 (red
points), as measured in our own setup, as shown in Fig. 6.5.
As an information leakage of 0.5% has a negligible effect on the key rate, an
isolator would not be needed as a countermeasure since even with a very low insertion
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Fig. 6.5 Secure key rate in the presence of backflashes. Secure key rate plotted
in the absence of backflashes, with the measured information leakage and previous
state-of-the-art. Even with PL = 6%, the effect on the key rate is negligible, as the term
PL gives the exact amount by which the key rate is reduced.
loss of 0.2 dB, it would have a greater impact on the key rate. This result provides
strong evidence that backflashes are not a significant threat to QKD, even for slower
gated detectors where the information leakage is potentially larger.
6.6 Origin of backflashes
As a second experiment to probe the origin of the APD backflashes, we switch off the
laser and remove the WDMs in Fig. 6.1 and measure the backflashes with the APD
kept under dark conditions. We measure the SSPD count rate as a function of the APD
dark current by adjusting the DC bias to the APD. The result is given in Fig. 6.6.
Initially the SSPD count rate remains at the dark count level until the APD current
reaches a value of approximately 10 nA. After about 100 nA, the data appears to follow
a linear trend and this is confirmed by fitting the data points. This finding supports the
hypothesis that backflashes arise from carriers in the multiplication region; a higher
dark current arises from the larger electric field increasing the avalanche probability,
thereby generating more carriers which cause backflashes.
To confirm the avalanche charge is the dominant factor in backflash emission, we
keep the APD in dark conditions and perform the same measurement, this time with
the AC signal to the APD switched off. This is shown in Fig. 6.7. The data points
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Fig. 6.6 SSPD count rate as a function of APD dark current. The linear relation-
ship between the two strongly points to backflashes originating in the InP multiplication
region.
overlap almost completely, which suggests the exact biasing technique is not important
in determining backflash emission, rather the avalanche charge, and hence the number
of carriers, is the numeric of interest.
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Fig. 6.7 SSPD count rate as a function of APD dark current in the presence and
absence of the APD AC gating signal. The linear relationship is still preserved with
the AC off (shown in black squares) and the data closely matched that taken with




In conclusion, we have performed the first investigation of backflashes in GHz-gated
APDs. As suggested in the literature, we have found that shorter APD gates reduce the
backflash rate and therefore Eve’s information due to the reduction of the avalanche
charge within the device. A new definition for the secure key rate in the presence
of backflashes was developed and it was shown that backflashes in both fast- and
slow-gated APDs have a negligible effect. Preliminary measurements to probe the
origin of backflashes were carried out and it was confirmed these arise in the device
multiplication region. Further measurements, namely by analysing the spectral charac-
teristics of this emission, will be required to conclusively state whether they arise from





• Best practice criteria for the operation of self-differencing avalanche photodi-
odes has been outlined for the first time. This highlights the importance of
operating devices appropriately, particularly with the choice of discrimination
level, as failing to follow such guidelines results in security loopholes that an
eavesdropper could exploit. This paves the way for standards to be developed,
easing the widespread implementation of quantum key distribution.
• A secure measure against the blinding attack was proposed and demonstrated
using an intensity modulator. This proof-of-principle was done using a lithium
niobate (LiNbO3) device to introduce extinction between adjacent APD gates
and thus prevent avalanche cancellation. It was found that only a 0.06 dB
extinction was required to completely eliminate the blinding attack. It was
also demonstrated that existing phase-encoded QKD protocols already possess
inherent protection against continuous wave blinding.
• Delayed detection events were discovered to be an effective measure for mitigat-
ing the after-gate attack on APDs. The origin of these delayed detections was
probed, with contributions arising from deep traps in the APD multiplication
region and material interface contributing. These detection events were incor-
porated in a new calculation of the QBER, showing that Eve cannot mount her
attack and remain undetected. Bounds on useable APD gating frequencies were
also established.
• The first investigation of backflashes in GHz-gated APDs was carried out. An
information leakage of 5×10−3 was measured for these devices, an order of
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magnitude less than that for slower gated devices shown in the literature. This
confirms the result that shorter gates exhibit fewer backflashes. The effect of
backflashes on the secure key rate was established and it was shown that the
security risk is minimal.
7.2 Future Work 97
7.2 Future Work
7.2.1 Implementation security
The security of self-differencing avalanche photodiodes (SD APDs) has been investi-
gated in this thesis and it has been found that these devices contain an inherent level of
protection against attacks. By explicitly defining the best practice for operating these
devices, blinding attacks were mitigated. It would therefore be useful to extend this
approach of ‘best practice’ to other classes of detectors, particularly gated APDs with-
out self-differencing circuitry and superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SSPDs) as these are widely used in the quantum key distribution (QKD) community.
Indeed a number of the best practice criteria are applicable to fast-gated detectors in
general, such as the appropriate setting of the discrimination level. Other components
in the system would of course need standards defined as well. For example, the
proportion above threshold that Alice should bias her laser diode in order to reduce the
fluctuation in her output photon flux would need to be stringently defined. In a system
that uses multiple lasers, which is common for free-space implementations (such as
[58]), the indistinguishability would need to be bounded between the sources such that
Eve cannot gain information from other degrees of freedom. Indeed, this has been
partly investigated using the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect [211], but even small deviations
produced a significant reduction in the obtained secure key rates, suggesting more
work is needed. This would facilitate the definition of standards, which is ongoing in
the work being carried out by ETSI, allowing QKD systems to be officially certified
and enter everyday life. To do this, security requirements or assumptions for each
component need to be defined. The parameters need to be identified, measured and
their deviation from the requirements quantified. After this, the information leakage
can be estimated to bound the Eve’s information. Finally, countermeasures can be
introduced, whether in software (such as additional privacy amplification) or hardware
(such as the intensity modulator, IM, in the APD blinding case).
To focus on the receiver, a number of requirements need to be fulfilled. Each
detector must have the same response to the same encoded state, independent of any
secondary degrees of freedom which are encoded on the optical pulse. Furthermore,
the detection efficiency must also be independent of these secondary degrees of free-
dom. For example, in a phase-encoded scheme, Eve must not be able to alter the
polarisation of Alice’s qubits in order to bias Bob’s detections. This is particularly
relevant to SSPDs, which are polarisation sensitive [212], but still needs to be ex-
plicitly established for APDs. All the detectors must be statistically identical and
the probability of detection by each device must be independent of the measurement
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settings. In essence, the detectors should, as closely as possible, behave according to
the security model, which consists of a beamsplitter, with a transmission arm equal to
the device’s detection efficiency, followed by a detector with a detection efficiency of
100%.
Intensity modulation was found to be an effective way to mitigate blinding in
the case of inappropriate operation. However, the IM used in the study contains a
significant insertion loss of at least 2.5 dB since it is designed for high extinction
operation. This loss penalty could significantly limit the achievable distance. Since
only low extinction is required (0.06 dB), it would be useful to demonstrate the
effectiveness of an IM with a shorter waveguide and subsequently smaller insertion
loss. Although the IM was shown to be effective and a short discussion surrounding
security was presented, a complete security proof incorporating this is still lacking.
By including blinding and IM as a countermeasure, much as photon-number-splitting
and decoy states are included, this attack can finally be discounted and the security
of APDs against it assured. Furthermore, demonstrating this countermeasure in a
complete QKD system, also employing modulation driven by a true QRNG would
provide further assurance that it is effective in preventing blinding attacks. Finally, the
IM, as with other components in the QKD system, would need standards to certify its
operation.
Delayed detection events were demonstrated to be effective at mitigating the after-
gate attack. However, this effect relies on imperfections within APDs to provide such
protection. If better devices are manufactured in the future (with a better InGaAsP
grading layer or an InP multiplication layer with fewer traps), this protection could
disappear. Therefore, analysis of the trade-off between this protection and the po-
tentially more efficient devices would need to be performed. Ideally, APDs would
be tailor-made for QKD applications and would include this consideration in their
manufacture. Alternatively, a suitable countermeasure could be proposed and demon-
strated: photon-number resolving InGaAs APDs, currently under development [113],
could be used which would be able to detect abnormal photon-fluxes; or more precise
electronics which could distinguish clicks outside of the normal detection window
within an APD gate [62].
A further open-question for detector attacks is that of detection efficiency mismatch
[143, 144]. This arises from the individual detectors at Bob being distinguishable,
specifically with regards to their detection efficiency as a function of photon arrival
time. Eve can exploit this by choosing the arrival time of her faked state pulses
to coincide with the higher detection efficiency of the detector she would like to
control. Furthermore, this discrepancy can be further exacerbated if she interferes with
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the calibration routine before QKD is performed [145]. However, if Bob is able to
randomise his detectors to detect bit ‘0’ or bit ‘1’, known as detector symmetrisation,
then this attack can be subverted as the average detection responses would be the same
across all bits and bases. Whilst this has been demonstrated in free-space polarisation
encoding QKD [213], it is yet to be shown in fibre-based phase encoding schemes
which are the current state-of-the-art. Most likely, this would involve the use of phase
modulators that induce additional shifts of π and 32π .
7.2.2 Quantum key distribution
In a more general sense for QKD, reducing the size of QKD systems is an ongoing goal
and photonic integrated circuits have been subject to intense research. Whilst receiver
chips that contain decoding apparatus that are usually done with bulk components have
been demonstrated [15, 214, 215], the integration of APDs has not yet been achieved.
Receiver chips could also then include specifically fabricated intensity modulators
with low extinction to add security against blinding attacks as a characteristic of this
integration.
Achieving larger secure key rates is an ongoing challenge for QKD. One of the
most apparent ways to do this is to simply increase the clock rate of the QKD system.
However, APDs are limited in this respect due to the necessity to have sufficiently long
gates to allow the avalanche to grow to overcome the discrimination level. Analysing
this trade-off would ensure APDs are operated to their optimum capacity. A further
bottleneck exists in the electronics within the QKD systems themselves such that they
cannot process the large volumes of data that occur at short distances, thereby limiting
the secure key rates at low loss [13].
Whilst QKD is a promising answer to the threat to cryptography posed by quantum
computers, other avenues have also been explored. These fall under the umbrella
term of post-quantum cryptography and are based on mathematical problems for
which no quantum computing algorithm yet exists. For the most part, post-quantum
cryptography and QKD have developed and operated separately, but a security system
combining the two approaches would add an extra layer of assurance (in case one
aspect is compromised) and could increase the secure bit rate offered by QKD alone
[60].
7.2.3 Avalanche photodiodes
Backflashes have been shown to have a minor impact on the secure key rate and
thus their existence is of relatively little concern to the QKD community. However,
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their precise origin is still an open question. Further studies to explore this could be
insightful, for example by measuring a very broad spectrum of the backflashes. This
could help isolate whether they arise from the relaxation of hot carriers, which would
produce broad emission, or recombination, which would be more correlated with the
band gap of InP.
Currently, APDs used in QKD are almost exclusively manufactured to the SAGCM
structure with an InGaAs absorption region and an InP multiplication. Whilst this has
produced detection efficiencies as high as 55% [68], there is still room for improve-
ment. A good area to focus would be the multiplication region as the aforementioned
devices had quantum efficiencies as high as 69%, suggesting that improving the
avalanche probability could raise the detection efficiency. InAlAs was shown to offer
theoretically higher breakdown probabilities than InP [216], however devices manu-
factured with InAlAs multiplication regions have thus far had very large dark count
rates making them impractical [84]. Another appealing approach is to use germanium
as an absorption material as it is sensitive to wavelengths up to 1600 nm. Furthermore,
it can be integrated with silicon (a candidate for the multiplication layer) and this
would open the door for CMOS integrated electronics, allowing such devices to be
fabricated easily, in large volumes and at low cost. This has been explored in several
studies [217–219], most notably in a recent investigation [220] where single-photon
detection efficiencies as high as 38% and lower afterpulsing rates than commercial
InGaAs/InP devices were reported. Although lower temperatures were required to
achieve reasonable dark count rates (78 K was need to go below a DCR of 10 kHz)
and the gating frequency was limited to 1 kHz, this is an interesting avenue for the
future of APDs in QKD.
7.3 Conclusion
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises the ability for two parties to share a
secret key with perfect, unbreakable security. However, this is only true in theory; in
practice, components do not perform to their ideal best and show deviations from the
theoretically predicted behaviour. These deviations can provide side-channels for Eve
to exploit, although currently many of them are beyond current technology.
In recent years, as interest in quantum computing and secure communication has
escalated, QKD has started to enter into real-world applications. Demonstrations over
optical networks and using satellites have highlighted the growing activity surrounding
quantum-secured communication and further underlined that this technology will
likely play an ever-increasing role in everyday life. This means that significant effort is
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required to make QKD practical and suitable for day-to-day use, as well as providing
assurance that it can deliver the high level of security it promises. By writing standards
and closing security loopholes, steps can be taken to achieve these goals.
Self-differencing avalanche photodiodes (SD APDs) are key enablers of QKD due
to their ability to operate at room temperature, register high count rates and demonstrate
excellent single-photon detection characteristics. It is therefore likely that SD APDs
will be present in many QKD systems. Due to their potential for widespread use, it will
become necessary to define standards to which these components will need to conform.
A first step is to identify the best practice for their operation, which is performed in this
thesis. By following a particular procedure, the users can have reasonable confidence
that the APD has been setup appropriately. Inappropriate operation, in particular with
regards to discrimination level, can allow Eve to perform a blinding attack which
would otherwise be out of her reach. The use of a quenching resistor in the DC path to
the APD also impacts the required optical power needed to achieve blinding.
Whilst following a certain prescription for operation of SD APDs was shown to
be effective at preventing blinding, naturally these steps are not always carried out
precisely. Ideally, the onus should be removed from the user, such that security is
preserved even if human error is introduced. By placing an intensity modulator directly
in front of the detector, and extinguishing a fraction of APD gates, the blinding attack
can be effectively mitigated. Indeed, only an extinction ratio of 0.06 dB is required to
ensure no blinding takes place, meaning the potential loss penalty would be small. A
brief security analysis was carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness of this measure.
It was also found that phase-encoded QKD protocols, which contain an asymmetric
Mach-Zehnder interferometer at Bob, already possess this modulation due to the finite
performance of the initial PBS. However, this is only applicable to continuous wave
blinding; Eve can circumvent this using a pulsed laser and avoid interference at the
final beamsplitter.
Blinding attacks have been demonstrated to be an effective technique available to
Eve, but arguably a more powerful tool for her is the after-gate attack. This method
of eavesdropping does not require a blinding laser, simply the trigger pulse, hence is
theoretically more difficult to detect. This attack is demonstrated to be superficially
effective at producing a quantum bit error rate (QBER) below the 11% threshold for key
abortion, suggesting Eve could remain unnoticed. However, by incorporating delayed
detection events into the analysis of the QBER, her presence can be revealed. These
delayed detections arise due to a combination of effects: carriers failing to overcome
the potential barrier formed at the interface between the InGaAs absorption and InP
charge regions and carriers becoming trapped by defects in the InP multiplication
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region. By assuming the material interface is the major contributor, we were able to
bound the useable APD gating frequencies by Bob. This bound ensures the probability
of delayed detection events is sufficiently low to perform QKD but also sufficiently
high that they provide protection against the after-gate attack.
In the past, it has been shown that Eve can gain information passively without the
need to interact with Bob’s detectors at all. This can occur due to the emission of light
by the APDs on detection, known as backflashes. The first study on GHz-gated APDs
was performed with the use of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors to
monitor the backflashes. It was confirmed that faster gating frequencies, and therefore
shorter gates and smaller avalanche charges, reduce the amount of backflashes. Eve’s
information was quantified and the subsequent impact on the secure key rate was
determined and found to be negligible.
To sum up, QKD is moving ever closer to becoming a key component in a new
era of security. APDs are are the most attractive candidate for use as single-photon
detectors due to their ability to show excellent detection characteristics at temperatures
close to room temperature as well as having a small footprint and low cost compared
to their nearest competitors. By employing self-differencing circuitry, gated APDs
have shown record detection efficiencies and secure key rates. Whilst some question
marks have existed in the past over the practical security of these devices, this thesis
has rigorously tackled the most prominent and dangerous of these, as well as showing
that a significant amount of protection is already inherent within these detectors. This
further highlights how self-differencing APDs are likely to play a major role in future
QKD developments.
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